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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BUT NOT THE PRESENCE OF
COUNSEL: A SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
FOR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE
John P. Gross*
Abstract
There is a widely-held belief that the state provides counsel to indigent
criminal defendants at their initial appearance in state court. However,
the majority of states do not provide counsel to indigent defendants at
their initial appearance when a judicial officer determines conditions of
pretrial release. State criminal procedure codes fail to provide the same
procedural protections that defendants have in federal court. Indeed,
states systems are characterized by predictive determinations regarding
guilt, an overemphasis on the potential dangerousness of defendants, a
lack of adequate pretrial services, and continued reliance on financial
securities.
The U.S. Supreme Court has done little to protect the constitutional
rights of indigent criminal defendants when they initially appear before a
judicial officer that has the power to restrict their liberty, despite the fact
that the setting of bail implicates an indigent defendant’s right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment and the right to due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never found
the setting of bail to be a critical stage of the proceedings that would
require the presence of counsel or discussed what procedural safeguards
should be in place to protect the rights of indigent defendants. These
failures may contribute to rising rates of pretrial incarceration, a trend that
the Court should take steps to reverse by finding a right to counsel at an
indigent defendant’s initial appearance where a judicial officer has the
power to place restrictions on their liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, the Bail Reform Act of 19661 transformed the way in
which federal judicial officials made decisions about pretrial release.
Instead of requiring financial securities, such as cash or secured bonds,
the act required federal judicial officials to release defendants on their
1. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–51
(2012)).
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own recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond unless such a release would not reasonably assure the appearance
of the defendant. Judicial officers were permitted to consider the weight
of the evidence against the defendant but were required to balance it
against other factors such as a defendant’s ties to the community,
reputation, and financial resources. The goal was to create a system where
judicial officers made individualized determinations regarding pretrial
release and where the wealth of the defendant was not the sole factor that
determined whether he would remain at liberty before his trial.
To help accomplish that goal, the Act permitted judicial officers to
impose certain conditions on a defendant’s release, such as releasing the
defendant to the custody of a designated person or organization that
would be responsible for the defendant’s supervision. This led to the
development of pretrial service agencies that both assisted federal judicial
officials by making recommendations regarding conditions of pretrial
release and supervised defendants after their release. While the Bail
Reform Act of 19842 permitted a federal judicial officer to consider the
potential danger a defendant’s release posed to an individual or the
community at large, it also afforded any defendant who was denied bail
the right to a prompt hearing where counsel would represent the
defendant, defendant has the right to cross examine witnesses, and the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant is dangerous by
clear and convincing evidence. In federal courts, “liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”3
The same is not true in state courts. The first Part of this Article
discusses the procedures used in federal and state courts at a defendant’s
initial appearance before a judicial officer who has the power to place
restrictions on their liberty, with an emphasis on how those procedures
impact indigent defendants.4 The majority of states does not provide
counsel to indigent defendants at their initial appearance. For indigent
defendants, states typically appoint counsel, but counsel is rarely present
at indigent defendants’ initial appearance when a judicial officer
determines conditions of pretrial release.
An aspect of the federal system that states have embraced is that
judicial officers set conditions of release based on the likelihood of
conviction and the potential threat a defendant poses to public safety.
However, states have failed to provide the same procedural protections
that defendants have in federal court if they are denied bail.5 In sharp
2.
(2012)).
3.
4.
5.

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–450
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
See infra Part I.
See infra Subsections I.B.2–.3.
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contrast to the federal system, state judicial officers rely on financial
securities to ensure a defendant’s return to court as evidenced by the
continued use of bail schedules.6
While a pretrial service agency assists federal judicial officers in
determining appropriate conditions of release and supervises defendants
who are released, states have failed to create similar systems. 7 Even
though state judicial officers have the power to set a variety of pretrial
release conditions, they typically lack the type of information needed to
make an informed decision regarding the least restrictive conditions that
would be necessary to ensure a defendant’s return to court. In addition,
the absence of pretrial services discourages the release of low risk
defendants.
While the apathy of state legislatures toward indigent defense is
certainly to blame, the Supreme Court has done little to protect the
constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants when they initially
appear before a judicial officer that has the power to restrict their liberty.
The second Part of this Article discusses how the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment supports
the argument that the procedures currently in use in state courts for
determining conditions of pretrial release make a defendant’s initial
appearance a “critical stage” of the proceedings that requires the presence
of counsel.8
Current state practices regarding pretrial release implicate the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in five specific ways. First, since the law
requires judicial officers to consider factors such as the weight of the
evidence against the defendant, the likely outcome at trial, and any
potential defenses the defendant might have, one can view a defendant’s
initial appearance as a trial-like confrontation that requires the presence
of counsel.9 Second, while the Court has often tried to limit the right to
counsel to proceedings that would have an impact on the outcome at trial,
the overwhelming evidence is that pretrial incarceration negatively
impacts trial outcomes for defendants.10 Third, the Court has also linked
the right to counsel to actual incarceration, holding that if a court is to
impose any amount of incarceration as a sentence, then they must provide
counsel to an indigent defendant.11 If even a single day of incarceration
following conviction implicates the right to counsel, then it is difficult to
imagine that weeks or months of pretrial incarceration does not warrant
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Subsection I.B.4.
See infra Subsections I.B.4–.5.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
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the same protection.12 Fourth, the Court has also extended the right to
representation beyond the trial to sentencing hearings.13 In many ways, a
sentencing hearing, where a judicial officer often must decide between a
sentence of probation or incarceration, takes into account many of the
same factors that judicial officers must consider when making decisions
regarding pretrial release.14 Fifth, the Court has also recognized the
importance that pretrial representation, particularly in the context of plea
bargaining, plays in the criminal justice system.15 Since the criminal
justice system is now a system of pleas and not trials, defendants need
more than just the early appointment of counsel; they need the actual
presence of counsel at their initial appearance.
Even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that a defendant’s initial
appearance before a judicial officer who has the power to restrict the
defendant’s liberty was not a critical stage of the proceedings, pretrial
incarceration implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. The third Part of this Article examines the Court’s precedents
regarding the procedural requirements that must be in place before there
can be restrictions placed on someone’s liberty in civil proceedings.16 The
procedural due process that the Court requires in the context of parole
and probation revocation hearings and civil contempt proceedings calls
into question whether current state practices provide adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent the unwarranted deprivation of liberty.
The Court has characterized pretrial detention in criminal cases as
regulatory, not punitive; therefore, it does not amount to punishment
before trial, which would violate the Due Process Clause. Two of the
factors that weigh heavily in distinguishing between regulatory and
punitive detention are that the nature and extent of the detention not be
excessive in light of the harm it is trying to prevent and that the conduct
it is trying to prevent is not already considered a crime. 17 The failure of
states to adopt less restrictive measures for ensuring a defendant’s
appearance in court, like those provided by pretrial services agencies,
makes the states’ continued reliance on pretrial detention excessive in
light of the harm they are trying to prevent, specifically the defendant’s
failure to appear. In addition, the failure of a defendant to appear in court
following the defendant’s pretrial release is a crime in every state. “Bail
Jumping” statutes have criminalized the harm states are trying to prevent
through pretrial incarceration. This suggests that pretrial detention for
defendants who are not considered to be dangerous and present a low risk
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Section II.F.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section III.B.
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of flight may no longer be fairly characterized as regulatory but has
instead become punitive.
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between when the right to
counsel “attaches” and when the law entitles an indigent defendant to
have a lawyer present in court. The fourth Part of this Article discusses
how this distinction implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause for indigent defendants.18 The Court has clarified that
the right to counsel attaches at a defendant’s first appearance before a
judicial officer, which means that a defendant has an absolute right to
legal representation at the initial appearance, but only if the defendant can
afford to hire counsel. While the Equal Protection Clause does not require
counsel to be appointed merely because it would be beneficial, it does
require that a state ensure that an indigent defendant has a fair opportunity
to present his defense.19 Because the initial appearance is a trial-like
confrontation that can impact the ultimate outcome of the case, to permit
the wealthy to have counsel but deny that same right to the indigent would
amount to a violation of equal protection.
Other state practices regarding pretrial release determinations may
also violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Some
judicial officers are required to affix an amount of bail to arrest warrants,
and some rely on bail schedules that require the setting of a financial
surety based solely on the offense charged.20 The U.S. Department of
Justice has taken the position that these practices deny equal protection
to indigent defendants. The continued reliance on financial sureties as a
condition of pretrial release is especially troubling when the vast majority
of criminal defendants in the country are unable to afford their own
lawyer.
I. BAIL DETERMINATIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
The procedures that govern a defendant’s initial appearance before a
judicial officer who has the power to place restriction on the defendant’s
liberty vary from state to state, but there are more similarities than
differences among them. State procedural codes also call for the
consideration of many of the same factors that federal courts consider but
lack the procedural protections afforded defendants in federal court.
A. Federal Procedures
In February of 1963, the Report of the Attorney General’s
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Justice described the
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Sections IV.A–.B.
20. See infra Section IV.C.
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bail hearing as “an obviously crucial stage in the administration of bail”
but found that “American bail administration largely fails to provide the
bail-setting authority with relevant factual data indispensable to sound
bail decisions.”21 The report also found that “counsel is never or rarely
assigned to the financially incapacitated accused”22 and concluded that
“improvement of procedures at this stage is urgently required.”23 In
August of 1964, in his testimony before the Subcommittees on
Constitutional Rights and Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
described the bail setting practices then in use as “unrealistic and often
arbitrary” and noted the “cruelty and cost” associated with unnecessary
pretrial detention.24
Congress responded by passing the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,25
which established a comprehensive system for appointing and
compensating lawyers to represent indigent defendants,26 and the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, which required the release of a defendant on his
personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond unless the judicial officer determines that release will not
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant.27 The Bail Reform
Act also allowed the judicial officer to impose conditions of release, such
as placing the defendant “in the custody of a designated person or
organization”28 and placing restrictions on her “travel, association or
place of abode”29 to secure her appearance at trial. It also set out the
criteria that judicial officers should consider when imposing conditions
of release such as
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused’s
family ties, employment, financial resources, character and
21. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (1963), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/Previous-CJAStudies/Allen%20Committee%20Report%20(1963).pdf.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id. at 67.
24. Hearing on Bail Legislation Before the Subcomms. on Constitutional Rights and
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Judiciary Comm., 88th Cong. 2, 4 (1964) (statement
of
Robert
F.
Kennedy,
Att’y
Gen.
of
the
United
States),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf.
25. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(2012)).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
27. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214–16 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–
50 (2012)).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1).
29. Id. § 3146(a)(2).
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mental condition, the length of his residence in the
community, his record of convictions, and his record of
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid
prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.30
While the Bail Reform Act did not eliminate the use of financial
securities such as bail bonds,31 the goal was to eliminate a system where
defendants, who had yet to be convicted, had to pay for their freedom.
Over the last fifty years, the procedures in federal court for
determining the conditions of pretrial release have not remained static.
Perhaps the two most significant developments over that time have been
the increased reliance on pretrial services, both before and after the
judicial officer makes a determination regarding pretrial release,32 and
the ability to deny a defendant release based on a predication regarding
her future dangerousness.33 Nevertheless, release without financial
conditions remains the norm in federal court. That is not the case in state
courts where judges continue to rely on financial securities when making
decisions regarding pretrial release.

30. Id. § 3146(b).
31. Id. § 3146(a)(4).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (“Pretrial services functions shall include the
following: . . . Collect, verify, and report to the judicial officer, prior to the pretrial release
hearing, information pertaining to the pretrial release of each individual charged with an offense,
including information relating to any danger that the release of such person may pose to any other
person or the community, and, where appropriate, include a recommendation as to whether such
individual should be released or detained and, if release is recommended, recommend appropriate
conditions of release . . . .”); id. § 3154(4) (“Pretrial services functions shall include the
following: . . . Operate or contract for the operation of appropriate facilities for the custody or care
of persons released under this chapter including residential halfway houses, addict and alcoholic
treatment centers, and counseling services, and contract with any appropriate public or private
agency or person, or expend funds, to monitor and provide treatment as well as nontreatment
services to any such persons released in the community, including equipment and emergency
housing, corrective and preventative guidance and training, and other services reasonably deemed
necessary to protect the public and ensure that such persons appear in court as required.”); Betsy
Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled
Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 325–30 (1987). In 1974, Congress
passed the Speedy Trial Act, a portion of which authorized the creation of pretrial services
programs in ten specified federal judicial districts. Id. at 326. These programs interviewed
defendants before their initial appearance to provide the judicial officer with information on their
background, recommended conditions of release, and pretrial supervision to defendants who were
released. Id. at 326–27. These programs reduced the rate of pretrial detention and defendants who
were under their supervision were less likely to be rearrested or fail to appear in court. Id. at 327.
The success of these programs led to the enactment of the Pretrial Services Act in 1982, which
expanded pretrial services to all federal judicial districts. Id. at 329.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (stating that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 permitted the
judicial officer making the bail determination to consider “the nature and seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release”).
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While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that a defendant
“who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to
represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial
appearance through appeal,”34 the appointment procedure itself is the
product of local court rules.35 In addition, the requirement that counsel be
made available at a defendant’s initial appearance is undermined by the
fact that, during a defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer,
the defendant must be informed of their “right to retain counsel or to
request that counsel be appointed,”36 and the judicial officer “must detain
or release the defendant.”37
If the defendant is released from custody, and even if that release
comes with certain conditions, it is difficult to argue that the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated in any meaningful
way. A defendant’s initial appearance as laid out in the Rules of Federal
Criminal Procedure is primarily ministerial. However, if the judicial
officer decides to detain a defendant, then the detention triggers
additional procedural protections. A detention hearing must be held and
at that hearing, the defendant has “the right to be represented by counsel,
and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have
counsel appointed. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify,
to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the
hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”38
Defendants in state courts do not have the same procedural protections,
despite the fact that state judicial officials can consider the potential
dangerousness of a defendant.39

34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a); see also United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797, 800 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that there is no constitutional right to counsel at a defendant’s initial appearance
and giving the Rule 44(a) requirement that counsel be provided to an indigent defendant’s at the
initial appearance “a common sense interpretation” since “[o]ne of the tasks performed at an initial
appearance is the appointment of counsel” requiring “counsel be appointed before the judge asks
routine questions such as the defendant’s name and financial ability would be self-defeating”),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(b).
36. Id. 5(d)(1)(B).
37. Id. 5(d)(3).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
39. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment &
the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1330 (2012) (noting that the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984 “was paralleled on the state level by no fewer than thirty-four states
articulating specific statutory provisions allowing detention based on a defendant’s
dangerousness, as opposed to a risk of flight”).
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B. State Procedures
In the majority of states, indigent defendants are not provided with
counsel when they first appear before a judicial officer who has the power
to place restrictions on their liberty. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer,
where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to
restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger
the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”40 As will be
discussed in more detail below, there is a difference between the
“attachment” of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
requirement that counsel actually be present during a specific stage of the
criminal proceeding.41
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether there is
a legal requirement that counsel be present at a defendant’s initial
appearance where his liberty is subject to restriction. That may be, at least
in part, because the Court is under the mistaken assumption that counsel
is actually present in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Consider the
following assertion made by the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin,42 a case
where the defendant was, in fact, represented at his bail hearing by a
public defender: “The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the
first formal proceeding against an accused, and in most States, at least
with respect to serious offenses, free counsel is made available at that
time and ordinarily requested.”43 The Court offers absolutely no support
for this claim. The Court reiterates this claim in Rothgery v. Gillespie
County44 where it references McNeil and the Amicus Brief of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, stating that “[w]e are advised
without contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including
the District of Columbia, but 43 States take the first step toward
appointing counsel ‘before, at, or just after initial appearance.’”45 There
is a critical difference, however, between taking the first steps toward the
appointment of counsel and the actual presence of counsel at a hearing
where a judicial officer places restrictions on a defendant’s liberty.
The fact that local custom and practice often trumps statewide rules
of criminal procedure complicates determining the procedures used in the
thousands of local courts throughout the country for handling a

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
See infra Part II.
501 U.S. 171 (1991).
Id. at 173, 180–81.
554 U.S. 191 (2008).
Id. at 203–04.
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defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer.46 Even when there
is a clear statutory requirement that counsel be made available to an
indigent defendant, it is often ignored.47
In addition, as the Supreme Court has noted, state criminal procedure
can vary a great deal from one state to another.48 That being said, there is
a great deal of consistency regarding the issues determined at a
defendant’s initial appearance in state courts even if the procedures used
to do so vary. Defendants are typically informed of the charges against
them, advised of certain rights, including the right to have counsel
appointed if they are indigent, conditions of pretrial release are
determined, and, if the arrest was made without a warrant, the judicial
officer determines if there was probable cause for the arrest.
The reality is that the majority of state court criminal procedural rules
assume that counsel will not represent a defendant at her initial
appearance before a judicial officer who has the authority to place
restrictions on her liberty.
1. The Appointment but Not the Presence of Counsel
An examination of state criminal procedural codes concerning a
defendant’s initial appearance, including the procedures used to assign
counsel for the indigent, reveals that in thirty-two states, counsel for
indigent defendants is not physically present at the initial appearance.49
In Alabama, at a defendant’s “initial appearance,” the judge or
magistrate informs the defendant of the right to counsel and that if the
defendant is indigent and unable to obtain counsel, that counsel will be
appointed,50 and determines “conditions of release.”51
In Alaska, at the “misdemeanor arraignment or felony first
appearance,” the judge or magistrate informs the defendant of the
defendant’s right to counsel52 and “right to request the appointment of
46. See, e.g., Counsel at First Appearance, N.Y. ST. OFF. INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/counsel-first-appearance (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
47. DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 962, 977 –78 (Md. 2012) (holding that statutory law
obligated the Office of the State Public Defender to represent indigent defendants at their initial
appearance), on reconsideration, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013).
48. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) (recognizing “that state systems of
criminal procedure vary widely” and that “[t]here is no single preferred pretrial procedure”).
49. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel
at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. But see Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without
Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (2011) (reaching a different conclusion regarding the
availability of counsel at a defendant’s initial appearance based on a survey of public defenders
and assigned counsel).
50. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 4.4(a)(3).
51. Id. 4.4(a)(4).
52. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(3)(A).
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counsel at public expense if the defendant is financially unable to employ
counsel”53 and “shall admit the defendant to bail.”54
In Arizona, at the suspect’s initial appearance, the magistrate shall
“[a]ppoint counsel if the suspect is eligible for and requests appointed
counsel”55 and “[d]etermine the conditions of release.”56
In Arkansas, once a judicial officer has informed a defendant of the
charges, the right to remain silent, and the right to counsel, “[n]o further
steps in the proceedings other than pretrial release inquiry may be taken
until the defendant and his counsel have had an adequate opportunity to
confer.”57
In Colorado, at the first appearance of the defendant in court, the judge
informs the defendant that they have a right to counsel,58 that if they are
indigent, they can apply for a court-appointed attorney, and “upon
payment of the application fee, he or she will be assigned counsel”59 and
“the amount of bail that has been set by the court.”60
In Georgia, at the first appearance, a judicial officer determines
“whether or not the accused desires and is in need of an appointed
attorney”61 and also sets the amount of bail.62 Indigent defendants in
Georgia who have been taken into custody can then wait up to three
business days before they are entitled to the services of appointed
counsel.63
In Illinois, once arrested, a person is “taken without unnecessary delay
before the nearest and most accessible judge”64 who then advises “the
defendant of his right to counsel and if indigent shall appoint a public
defender,”65 schedules a preliminary hearing when necessary,66 and
admits a defendant to bail.67

53. Id. 5(c)(3)(B).
54. Id. 5(c)(5).
55. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.2(a)(5).
56. Id. 4.2(a)(7).
57. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.3(b).
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-207(1)(b) (2016).
59. Id. § 16-7-207(1)(c).
60. Id. § 16-7-207(1)(e).
61. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 26.1(C).
62. Id. 26.1(H).
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23(b) (2016) (“[E]ntitlement to the services of counsel begins
not more than three business days after the indigent person is taken into custody or service is made
upon him or her of the charge, petition, notice, or other initiating process and such person makes
an application for counsel to be appointed.”).
64. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/109-1(a) (2016).
65. Id. 5/109-1(b)(2).
66. Id. 5/109-1(b)(3).
67. Id. 5/109-1(b)(4).
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In Indiana, at the “initial hearing,”68 the judicial officer informs a
defendant “that he has a right to assigned counsel at no expense to him if
he is indigent”69 and “the amount and conditions of bail.”70
In Kentucky, at a defendant’s initial appearance before a judge, “[t]he
defendant has the burden of first establishing his or her indigency before
counsel may be appointed,”71 and if the court concludes that the
defendant is indigent, “then the appointment shall continue for all future
stages of the criminal proceeding.”72
Louisiana requires that someone who has been arrested be brought
before a judge within seventy-two hours “for the purpose of appointment
of counsel”73 and permits the court to “determine or review a prior
determination of the amount of bail.”74
In Michigan, an arrestee will be brought to a judge for arraignment
where the judge will inform the arrestee “of the right to a lawyer at all
subsequent court proceedings,”75 and the judge will “determine what
form of pretrial release, if any, is appropriate.”76 A recent report by the
Michigan Indigent Defense Commission found that “[o]nly 6% of district
courts require attorneys to be present at both the bail hearing and at
arraignment, despite the documented importance of legal guidance in
these early stages.”77
In Minnesota, “[t]he purpose of the first appearance is for the court to
inform the defendant of the: defendant’s rights, including the right to have
counsel appointed if eligible”78 but the court also “must set bail and other
conditions of release.”79
In Montana, at a defendant’s initial appearance, if a defendant “desires
assigned counsel because of financial inability to retain private
68. IND. CODE § 35-33-7-5 (2016).
69. Id. § 35-33-7-5(2).
70. Id. § 35-33-7-5(4).
71. KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.05(2).
72. Id.
73. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 230.1(A) (2016).
74. Id. art. 230.1(B); see also State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1995) (implicitly
approving of the setting of bond outside of the presence of appointed counsel).
75. MICH. CT. R. CRIM. P. 6.104(E)(3).
76. Id. 6.104(E)(5). But see MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PROPOSED MINIMUM
STANDARDS SET 1 FOR DISTRIBUTION 7 (2015), http://michiganidc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2015/04/Proposed-Minimum-Standards-June-22-2015.pdf (requiring counsel be available to
indigent defendants “as soon as the defendant’s liberty is subject to restriction by a magistrate or
judge”).
77. JONAH A. SIEGEL, MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, SNAPSHOT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION IN MICHIGAN’S ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (2016), http://michiganidc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/MIDC-Court-Survey-Report-Feb-16.pdf.
78. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.01(a)(2).
79. Id. 5.01(d).
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counsel . . . the court shall order the office of state public defender . . . to
assign counsel to represent the defendant without unnecessary delay”80
and also “admit the defendant to bail as provided by law.”81
Nebraska permits defendants who are unable to fulfill their conditions
of release to request “a review by the judge who imposed the conditions”
after they have been in custody for twenty-four hours,82 and “[i]f the
defendant is indigent and unable to retain legal counsel, the judge shall
appoint an attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of such
review.”83
Nevada gives indigent defendants the right to have counsel “at every
stage of the proceedings from the defendant’s initial appearance before a
magistrate,”84 but magistrates only inform indigent defendants of their
right to have counsel appointed at their initial appearance while
simultaneously setting bail.85 However, magistrates must delay holding a
preliminary hearing if an indigent defendant has requested that counsel
be appointed, since Nevada considers a preliminary hearing a critical
stage of the proceedings.86
In New Jersey, if the offense charged is indictable, the defendant is
informed of her right to appointed counsel and bail is set at the initial
appearance.87
In New Mexico, the first appearance in court in response to a
summons, warrant, or arrest is referred to as an “arraignment,” and the
law requires the court to inform indigent defendants of their “right . . . to
representation by an attorney at state expense”88 and “enter an order
prescribing conditions of release.”89
North Carolina calls for the representation “as soon as feasible after
the indigent is taken into custody or service is made upon him of the
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(2) (2016); see also id. § 46-7-102(1)(c).
81. Id. § 46-7-102(2).
82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.03 (2016).
83. Id.
84. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.397 (2016).
85. Id.; see also id. § 173.195.
86. Id. § 171.196(4); see also Schnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1970);
Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 145 P.3d 1002, 1004 (Nev. 2006) (holding that “[b]ecause of the
adversarial nature of the preliminary examination and the risk of substantial prejudice, criminal
defendants are entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the proceeding”).
87. N.J. R. CT. 3:4-2(c); see also State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 1030–31 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1990) (finding “[t]he setting of bail certainly is a ‘critical stage’ in the criminal
proceedings” but concluding that “immediate arrangements for representation . . . in connection
with the setting of bail, are impossible” and therefore holding that representation must be made
available to indigent defendant “at the first bail review held after the first appearance”).
88. N.M. R. CRIM. P. MAGIS. CTS. 6-501(A)(5).
89. Id. 6-501(E).
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charge”90 but only guarantees counsel at “[a] hearing for the reduction of
bail, or to fix bail if bail has been earlier denied.”91
North Dakota gives an indigent defendant the right to counsel “at
every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal,”92
but a magistrate merely informs a defendant of this right during his initial
appearance93 and also sets bail.94
In Ohio, “[w]hen a defendant first appears before a judge or
magistrate, the judge or magistrate shall permit the accused or the
accused’s counsel to read the complaint” and “shall admit the defendant
to bail.”95
In Oklahoma, a defendant’s application for counsel “shall state
whether or not the indigent has been released on bond,” and if he has been
released on bond, “the application shall include a written statement from
the applicant that the applicant has contacted three named attorneys,
licensed to practice law in this state, and the applicant has been unable to
obtain legal counsel.”96
In Pennsylvania, counsel is “appointed to represent indigent
defendants immediately after they are brought before the issuing
authority in all summary cases in which a jail sentence is possible, and
immediately after preliminary arraignment in all court cases.”97 While the
law requires the judicial officer setting bail in Pennsylvania to consider a
number of factors when setting bail, including “the nature of the offense
charged and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear upon the
likelihood of conviction and possible penalty,”98 they are explicitly
prohibited from questioning the defendant about the offense charged.99
At a defendant’s initial appearance in Rhode Island, the judge must
inform the defendant of “the defendant’s right to request the assignment
of counsel if he or she is unable to obtain counsel . . . and, where

90. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-451(b) (2016).
91. Id. § 7A-451(b)(3).
92. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
93. Id. 5(b)(1)(D).
94. Id. 5(b)(1)(F).
95. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5(A).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355A (2016).
97. PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(C).
98. Id. 523(A)(1).
99. Id. 540(F); see also Flora v. Luzerne Cty., 103 A.3d 125, 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014)
(“At a preliminary arraignment, the defendant is advised of the charges against him, given a copy
of the warrant and bail is set. These events do not require the presence of counsel because no
rights are affected and there is no impact on the effectiveness of counsel’s representation at trial.
Therefore, there is no right to counsel at the preliminary arraignment.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds sub nom. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 751–52 (Pa. 2016).
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authorized by statute, shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in
these rules.”100
At an initial appearance in South Carolina, indigent defendants can
apply to the court for appointed counsel, and if the court grants their
application, then an officer of the court “shall immediately notify the
Office of the Public Defender . . . and the Public Defender shall
immediately thereafter enter upon the representation of the accused.”101
Consider the following excerpt from the South Carolina Judicial
Department’s Summary Court Judges Bench Book:
The bail proceeding is frequently the first contact between
the accused and a judicial officer, with respect to the
particular offense(s). For this reason, the bond proceeding is
a very important phase of the criminal process, though it has
never been held to be a stage at which the accused has the
right to be represented by counsel. The accused may have
his attorney present, but he has no absolute right to be
represented.102
The Tennessee Practice series on Criminal Practice & Procedure
contains the following advice:
Because the initial appearance immediately follows the
custodial apprehension of the defendant, a lawyer is seldom
retained at this early stage. However, if a defense attorney is
present at the initial appearance, the defense attorney should
inquire as to the validity of the warrant and participate in the
bail determination.103
In Texas, the bail hearing is conducted without the presence of defense
counsel,104 and when counsel is appointed for an indigent defendant may
depend on the population of the county where the defendant is charged
with a crime, rather than the Constitution.105
100. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5(b).
101. S.C. APP. CT. R. 602(c).
102. South Carolina Bench Book for Summary Court Judges § E(3), S.C. JUD. DEP’T,
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/summaryCourtBenchBook/HTML/CriminalE.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2017).
103. 9 DAVID LOUIS RAYBIN, TENNESSEE PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3:7, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015).
104. Lisa Falkenberg, For Those Accused in Harris County, It’s Time to Right a Legal
Wrong, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 9, 2016, 11:32 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
columnists/falkenberg/article/For-those-accused-in-Harris-County-it-s-time-to-6748263.php.
105. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(c) (West 2015) (providing that counsel for an
indigent defendant shall be appointed “as soon as possible, but not later than: (1) the end of the
third working day after the date on which the court or the courts’ designee receives the defendant’s
request for appointment of counsel, if the defendant is arrested in a county with a population of
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A person arrested in Utah “shall be taken to the nearest available
magistrate for setting of bail.”106 During this initial appearance before a
magistrate, the magistrate must also make a determination regarding
probable cause, an event that is not considered a critical stage of the
proceedings that requires the presence of counsel.107 If the magistrate
does find that there is probable cause, the magistrate must immediately
make a bail determination based on “the recommended bail amount in the
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause
to deviate from the Schedule.”108
In Vermont, during the initial appearance before a judicial officer,
there is a determination of probable cause,109 the defendant is informed
of the charges,110 the right to counsel,111 the right to remain silent,112 the
general circumstances under which the defendant can secure pretrial
release113 and, if not represented by counsel, “of the nature and
approximate schedule of further pretrial proceedings.”114 While no
further proceedings shall be had until the judicial officer has assigned
counsel and the defendant has had the opportunity to consult with
counsel,115 the law requires the judicial officer at that time to “determine
whether and on what conditions the defendant shall be released pending
trial.”116
A defendant in Washington has a right to a lawyer “as soon as feasible
after the defendant has been arrested, appears before a committing
magistrate, or is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest.”117 While
counsel should be provided to an indigent defendant at a preliminary

less than 250,000; or (2) the end of the first working day after the date on which the court or the
courts’ designee receives the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel, if the defendant is
arrested in a county with a population of 250,000 or more”).
106. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
107. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 126 (1975); Seibold v. Turner, 435 P.2d 289, 290–
91 (Utah 1967).
108. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(3)(B).
109. VT. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
110. Id. 5(d)(1).
111. Id. 5(d)(2).
112. Id. 5(d)(3).
113. Id. 5(d)(4).
114. Id. 5(d)(5).
115. Id. 5(f).
116. Id. 5(h).
117. WASH. CRIM. R. CTS. LTD. JURIS. 3.1(b)(1).
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appearance where the conditions of pretrial release are determined,118
evidence suggests that this rule is not always followed.119
In West Virginia, judicial officers “shall allow the defendant
reasonable time and opportunity to consult with counsel or with at least
one relative or other person for the purpose of obtaining counsel or
arranging bail.”120
In Wisconsin, the judicial officer informs a defendant at the initial
appearance of the defendant’s right to counsel and that “an attorney will
be appointed to represent him or her if he or she is financially unable to
employ counsel,”121 and the judicial officer “shall admit the defendant to
bail.”122
At a defendant’s initial appearance in Wyoming, “the court shall
advise any defendant who is a needy person of his right to be represented
by an attorney at public expense,”123 and if the defendant wishes to have
an attorney, “the court shall notify an available public defender for the
judicial district or shall appoint an attorney to represent the needy person
if no public defender is available.”124 The Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure make the determination of financial eligibility for assigned
counsel “a judicial function” and state that “[a]n attorney should be
appointed at the earliest time after a defendant makes a request, but only
after appropriate inquiry into the defendant’s financial circumstances and
a determination of eligibility.”125
Florida is an exception to the general rule that counsel need not be
present at an initial appearance before a judge or magistrate who has the
authority to restrict the defendant’s liberty.126
118. Id. 3.2.1(e)(1) (“At the preliminary appearance, the court shall provide for a
lawyer . . . for pretrial release . . . .”).
119. 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 202, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (“The notification of the attorney’s
appointment is ordinarily made by telephone as soon as is practicable after the appointment.”);
see also Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding
that cities’ public defense system deprived indigent criminal defendants of their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel).
120. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
121. WIS. STAT. § 970.02(1)(b) (2016).
122. Id. § 970.02(2).
123. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-105(b) (2016); see also Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1347
(Wyo. 1979) (holding that counsel does not need to be present prior to a preliminary hearing).
124. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-105(b).
125. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 44(b)(1).
126. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a) (“A person entitled to appointment of counsel as provided
herein shall have counsel appointed when the person is formally charged with an offense, or as
soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at the first appearance before a committing judge,
whichever occurs earliest.”); see also id. 3.130(c)(1) (“If practicable, the judge should determine
prior to the first appearance whether the defendant is financially able to afford counsel and
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Idaho is another exception; indigent defendants are entitled “[t]o be
represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own
counsel is so entitled,”127 which has led the Court of Appeals of Idaho to
require the appointment of counsel “unless a court determines the
proceeding is not one that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
proceeding.”128
Maine permits a court to designate “a lawyer for the day” to represent
an indigent defendant at their initial appearance but does not require it
before setting bail.129
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that, because
a defendant’s liberty is at stake in a bail hearing and a preventive
detention hearing, that “the principles of procedural due process
in . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights” require the presence of
counsel for indigent defendants.130
New Mexico uses language similar to that found in Idaho to define
when an indigent defendant has the right to representation. In New
Mexico, an indigent defendant “is entitled to be represented by an
attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel”131 and is
entitled to be “counseled and defended at all stages of the matter
beginning with the earliest time when a person providing his own counsel
would be entitled to be represented by an attorney.”132
The Court of Appeals of New York has held that because indigent
defendants have the “right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at
every subsequent stage of the action,”133 a court cannot proceed to arraign
a defendant and set bail without counsel being present.134 That being said,
the New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services has acknowledged
whether the defendant desires representation. When the judge determines that the defendant is
entitled to court-appointed counsel and desires counsel, the judge shall immediately appoint
counsel. This determination must be made and, if required, counsel appointed no later than the
time of the first appearance and before any other proceedings at the first appearance.”).
127. IDAHO CODE § 19-852(1)(a) (2016).
128. State v. Wegner, No. 33960, 2009 WL 32484, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2009), aff’d,
220 P.3d 1089, 1090 (Idaho 2009).
129. ME. R. CRIM. P. 5(e).
130. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 902–03 (Mass. 2004).
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-3(A) (2016).
132. Id. § 31-16-3(B)(1).
133. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(3) (McKinney 2016).
134. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that “nothing
in the statute may be read to justify the conclusion that the presence of defense counsel at
arraignment is ever dispensable, except at a defendant’s informed option, when matters affecting
the defendant’s pretrial liberty or ability subsequently to defend against the charges are to be
decided”).
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that “persons deemed eligible for indigent legal defense services continue
to be arraigned without counsel at first appearance.”135
Following a recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the
Office of the State Public Defender must now represent indigent
defendants at their initial appearance.136
If a defendant appears without counsel for arraignment in Oregon, the
court must inform the defendant that he has a right to counsel and delay
the arraignment if the defendant requests to have counsel appointed.137
Virginia also grants a defendant a right to a bail hearing “as soon as
practicable but in no event later than three calendar days, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays”138 and the right to counsel at that
hearing.139
2. Considering the Weight of the Evidence and the Likelihood
of Conviction
Thirty-one states expect judicial officers to assess the quality of the
evidence against a defendant, estimate the likelihood of conviction, and
the potential sentence that would be imposed when making a
determination regarding bail. These predictive determinations regarding
the defendant’s guilt take place at the defendant’s initial appearance
where, as previously described, defendants typically do not have the
benefit of legal representation.
Nineteen states ask the judicial officer who presides over a
defendant’s initial appearance to consider the weight of the evidence:

135. Counsel at First Appearance, NYS OFF. INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/counsel-first-appearance (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
136. See DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1031 (Md. 2013) (“At a defendant’s initial
appearance before a District Court Commissioner . . . the defendant is in custody and, unless
released on his or her personal recognizance or on bail, the defendant will remain incarcerated
until a bail review hearing before a judge. Consequently, we hold that, under Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant is entitled to state-furnished counsel at an
initial hearing before a District Court Commissioner.” (footnote omitted)).
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.040 (2016) (“If the defendant appears for arraignment without
counsel, the defendant shall be informed by the court that it is the right of the defendant to have
counsel before being arraigned and shall be asked if the defendant desires the aid of counsel.”).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-158 (2016).
139. Id. (providing that prior to the bail hearing “the accused shall be allowed a reasonable
opportunity to employ counsel of his own choice, or, if appropriate, the statement of
indigence . . . may be executed”).
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Alaska,140 Arizona,141 Florida,142 Kansas,143 Louisiana,144 Minnesota,145
Missouri,146 Montana,147 New Mexico,148 New York,149 North
Carolina,150 North Dakota,151 Ohio,152 Rhode Island,153 South Dakota,154

140. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(c)(2) (2016) (“In determining the conditions of release
under this chapter, the court shall consider . . . the weight of the evidence against the
person . . . .”), repealed and reenacted by Act of July 11, 2016, ch. 36, sec. 59, § 12.30.011(i)(2),
2016 Alaska Sess. Laws 33 (effective Jan. 1, 2018).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(6) (2016) (“In determining the method of release
or the amount of bail, the judicial officer . . . shall take into account all of the following: [t]he
weight of evidence against the accused.”).
142. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(3) (“In determining whether to release a defendant on bail or
other conditions, and what that bail or those conditions may be, the court may consider . . . the
weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(8) (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release will
reasonably assure appearance and the public safety, the magistrate shall . . . take into
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
144. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 334(2) (2016) (“The amount of bail shall be such that,
in the judgment of the court, commissioner, or magistrate, it will insure the presence of the
defendant, as required, and the safety of any other person and the community, having regard to:
The weight of the evidence against the defendant.”).
145. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(2)(a)–(b) (“In determining conditions of release the court must
consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the evidence . . . .”).
146. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (2013) (“In determining which conditions of release will
reasonably assure appearance, the associate circuit judge or judge shall . . . take into
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the accused . . . .”).
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(b) (2015) (“In determining whether the defendant
should be released or detained, the court shall take into account the available information
concerning: the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
148. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 6-401(B)(2) (“[The court considers] the weight of the evidence against
the person” when determining “conditions of release.”).
149. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(viii) (McKinney 2016) (“[Judges must consider]
the weight of the evidence . . . in the pending criminal action and any other factor indicating
probability or improbability of conviction [when making a bail determination].”).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(c) (2015) (“In determining which conditions of release to
impose, the judicial official must, on the basis of available information, take into account . . . the
weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
151. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(3)(B) (“In determining conditions of release that will reasonably
assure appearance of a person, the magistrate . . . must consider: the weight of the evidence
against the person . . . .”).
152. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46(C)(2) (“In determining the types, amounts, and conditions of bail,
the court shall consider all relevant information, including but not limited to: The weight of the
evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
153. R. CRIM. P. R.I. SUPER. CT. 46(c) (“If the defendant is admitted to bail, the terms thereof
shall be such as in the judgment of the court will insure the presence of the defendant, having
regard to . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
154. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-4 (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release
will reasonably assure appearance, a committing magistrate or court shall . . . take into
account . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . .”).
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Vermont,155 Virginia,156 and Wyoming.157
Another nine states ask the judicial officer who presides over a
defendant’s initial appearance to consider the likelihood or probability of
conviction and sentence: Alabama,158 Arkansas,159 Colorado,160 Idaho,161
Michigan,162 Nevada,163 New Jersey,164 Pennsylvania,165 and
Tennessee.166

155. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(b) (2016) (“In determining which conditions of release
to impose . . . the judicial officer shall . . . take into account . . . the weight of the evidence against
the accused . . . .”).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-121(iii) (2016) (“The judicial officer shall take into
account . . . the weight of the evidence . . . .”).
157. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 46.1(d)(2) (“The judicial officer shall . . . take into account the
available information concerning: The weight of the evidence against the person . . . .”).
158. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a)(6) (“The nature of the offense charged, the apparent probability
of conviction, and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of
nonappearance.”).
159. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b)(vi) (“The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of
factors relevant to the pretrial release decision, such as: the nature of the current charge and any
mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible
penalty.”).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(5)(f) (2016) (“The likely sentence, considering the nature
and the offense presently charged . . . .”).
161. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 46(c)(6) (“The determination of whether a defendant should be
released upon the defendant’s own recognizance or admitted to bail, and the determination of the
amount and conditions of bail, if any, can be made after considering any of the following factors:
The nature of the current charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the
likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty.”).
162. MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.106(F)(1)(e) (requiring that when a court is making a decision
regarding pretrial release and the appropriate conditions of release, the court “is to consider
relevant information, including the seriousness of the offense charged, the presence or absence of
threats, and the probability of conviction and likely sentence”).
163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853(7) (2015) (“[A court shall consider t]he nature of the
offense with which the person is charged, the apparent probability of conviction and the likely
sentence, insofar as these factors relate to the risk of not appearing.”).
164. N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:26-1(a)(1) (“[The court considers] the seriousness of the crime
charged against defendant, the apparent likelihood of conviction, and the extent of the punishment
prescribed by the Legislature.”), amended by N.J. Court Order 0021 (Aug. 30, 2016).
165. PA. R. CRIM. P. 523(1) (“[T]he bail authority shall consider . . . the nature of the offense
charged and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear upon the likelihood of conviction
and possible penalty . . . .”).
166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115(7) (2016) (“[T]he magistrate shall take into account:
The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence,
insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance . . . .”).
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Judicial officers consider the nature of the evidence against the
defendant in Maine167 and Maryland,168 the strength and character of the
evidence in Wisconsin,169 and both the weight of the evidence against a
defendant or the likelihood of conviction in Illinois.170
While federal magistrates consider “the weight of the evidence against
the accused” when determining conditions of release, there is evidence to
suggest that it is given less weight than some other factors.171
3. Considering the Potential Dangerousness of the Defendant
Twenty-eight states permit a judicial officer to deny bail to a
defendant who the judicial officer believes poses a threat to an individual
or the community at large: Alabama,172 Alaska,173 California,174

167. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 1026(4)(B) (2016) (“In setting bail, the judicial officer shall . . . take
into account the available information concerning the following: The nature of the evidence
against the defendant . . . .”).
168. MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-216(e)(1)(A) (“In determining whether a defendant should be
released and the conditions of release, the judicial officer shall take into account the following
information, to the extent available: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
nature of the evidence against the defendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction . . . .”).
169. WIS. STAT. § 969.01(4) (2016) (“Proper considerations in determining whether to
release the defendant without bail, fixing a reasonable amount of bail or imposing other reasonable
conditions of release are . . . the character and strength of the evidence which has been presented
to the judge . . . .”).
170. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2016) (“In determining the amount of monetary bail
or conditions of release, if any . . . the court shall . . . take into account such matters as the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged . . . the likelihood of conviction, the sentence applicable
upon conviction, the weight of the evidence against such defendant . . . .”).
171. United States v. Birges, 523 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Nev. 1981) (“The weight of the
evidence against the accused is also an indication that she may flee. However, the weight of the
evidence is to be accorded less weight than the other factors.”).
172. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a) (“Any defendant charged with an offense bailable as a matter
of right may be released . . . unless the court or magistrate determines that such a release will not
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required, or that the defendant’s being at large
will pose a real and present danger to others or to the public at large.”).
173. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b) (2016) (“If a judicial officer determines that the release
under (a) of this section will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person or will pose a
danger to the victim, other persons, or the community, the officer shall impose the least restrictive
condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the person’s appearance and protect the victim,
other persons, and the community.”), amended by Act of July 11, 2016, ch. 36, sec. 59, 2016
Alaska Sess. Laws 34 (effective Jan. 1, 2018).
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2016) (“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a
judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of
the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or
her appearing at trial or at a hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the primary
consideration.”).
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Colorado,175 Florida,176 Georgia,177 Idaho,178 Iowa,179 Kentucky,180
Maine,181 Maryland,182 Michigan,183 Minnesota,184 Missouri,185
175. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(3)(a) (2016) (“The type of bond and conditions of release
shall be sufficient to reasonably ensure the appearance of the person as required and to protect the
safety of any person or the community, taking into consideration the individual characteristics of
each person in custody, including the person’s financial condition.”).
176. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b)(1) (“The judicial officer shall impose the first of the following
conditions of release that will reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to
persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process .
. . .”).
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(e) (2016) (“A court shall be authorized to release a person on
bail if the court finds that the person: (1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction
of the court or failing to appear in court when required; (2) Poses no significant threat or danger
to any person, to the community, or to any property in the community . . . .”).
178. IDAHO CODE § 19-2902(2) (2016) (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a uniform
and comprehensive statewide process for the administration of bail in criminal cases in order to:
(a) Ensure the appearance of defendants before the courts; (b) Protect the right of defendants to
bail, as constitutionally provided; and (c) Ensure the protection and safety of victims, witnesses
and the public.”).
179. IOWA CODE § 811.2(1)(a) (2016) (“All bailable defendants shall be ordered released
from custody pending judgment or entry of deferred judgment on their personal recognizance, or
upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the magistrate
unless the magistrate determines in the exercise of the magistrate’s discretion, that such a release
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required or that release will
jeopardize the personal safety of another person or persons.”).
180. KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.16(1) (“The amount of bail shall be sufficient to insure compliance
with the conditions of release set by the court. . . . In determining such amount the court shall
consider . . . the defendant’s reasonably anticipated conduct if released and the defendant’s
financial ability to give bail.”).
181. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 1002 (2016) (“It is the purpose and intent of this chapter that bail
be set for a defendant in order to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required,
to otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process and, when applicable, to
reasonably ensure the safety of others in the community.”).
182. MD. CT. R. 4-216(e)(3) (“If the judicial officer determines that the defendant should be
released . . . the judicial officer shall impose on the defendant the least onerous condition or
combination of conditions of release . . . that will reasonably: (A) ensure the appearance of the
defendant as required, (B) protect the safety of the alleged victim by ordering the defendant to
have no contact with the alleged victim or the alleged victim’s premises or place of employment
or by other appropriate order, and (C) ensure that the defendant will not pose a danger to another
person or to the community.”).
183. MICH. CT. R. 6.106(C) (“[T]he court must order the pretrial release of the defendant on
personal recognizance, or on an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the court determines that
such release will not reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, or that such
release will present a danger to the public.”).
184. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(1) (“On appearance before the court, a person must be released
on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond unless a court determines that release
will endanger the public safety or will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance.”).
185. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.457.1 (2016) (“[U]pon a showing that the defendant poses a
danger to a crime victim, the community, or any other person, the court may use such information
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Montana,186 Nebraska,187 Nevada,188 New Hampshire,189 North
Carolina,190 Oregon,191 South Carolina,192 South Dakota,193 Texas,194

in determining the appropriate amount of bail, to increase the amount of bail, to deny bail entirely
or impose any special conditions which the defendant and surety shall guarantee.”).
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(d) (2015) (“In determining whether the defendant
should be released or detained, the court shall take into account the available information
concerning: the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would
be posed by the defendant’s release . . . .”).
187. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901 (2016) (“Any bailable defendant shall be ordered released
from custody pending judgment on his or her personal recognizance unless the judge determines
in the exercise of his or her discretion that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the defendant as required or that such a release could jeopardize the safety and maintenance of
evidence or the safety of victims, witnesses, or other persons in the community.”).
188. NEV. STAT. § 178.4851(1) (2015) (“[A]court may release without bail any person
entitled to bail if it appears to the court that it can impose conditions on the person that will
adequately protect the health, safety and welfare of the community and ensure that the person will
appear at all times and places ordered by the court.”).
189. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016) (requiring that a court shall order the pretrial
release of the defendant “unless the court determines that such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of the person or of any other
person or the community”).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b) (2016) (stating judge must release a defendant “unless
he determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as
required; will pose a danger of injury to any person; or is likely to result in destruction of evidence,
subornation of perjury, or intimidation of potential witnesses”).
191. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245(3) (2016) (“[T]he magistrate shall impose the least onerous
condition reasonably likely to ensure the safety of the public and the victim and the person’s later
appearance . . . .”).
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10(A) (2016) (mandating that a court should release a person
charged with a noncapital offense “unless the court determines in its discretion that such a release”
will result in “unreasonable danger to the community or an individual”).
193. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-2 (2016) (stating that a court should release a defendant
on “personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the
magistrate or court determines in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required or that the defendant may pose a
danger to any other person or to the community”).
194. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(5) (West 2016) (When requiring that a judicial
officer sets bail, “[t]he future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be
considered”).
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Utah,195 Virginia,196 Washington,197 and Wyoming.198
In addition to taking into consideration “the nature and seriousness of
the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person’s release,”199 New Mexico takes a more narrow and unique
approach to the issue of dangerousness by giving the court the option of
refusing to allow the complaining witness or alleged victim to post bond
for a defendant.200
Wisconsin permits monetary conditions of release to ensure a
defendant’s appearance in court but not to protect members of the
community.201 If the court finds that a defendant is a threat to the
community, then other conditions of release can be imposed.202
Wisconsin also requires that an initial decision to deny release based on
allegations “that available conditions of release will not adequately
protect members of the community from serious bodily harm or prevent
the intimidation of witnesses”203 be followed by, just as in federal court,
a “pretrial detention hearing” where the defendant has “the right of
confrontation, right to call witnesses, right to cross-examination and right
to representation by counsel.”204
Washington has a similar statutory scheme where defendants are
entitled to a hearing “to determine whether any condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and

195. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(3)(d) (West 2016) (stating that a magistrate may impose
conditions that will reasonably “ensure the safety of the public”).
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(A)(2) (2016) (stating that a person should be admitted to
bail unless “[h]is liberty will constitute an unreasonable danger to himself or the public”).
197. WASH. CRIM. R. CTS. LTD. JURIS. 3.2(d) (stating that a court may impose restriction on
a defendant’s liberty “[u]pon a showing that there exists a substantial danger that the accused will
commit a violent crime or that the accused will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise
unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice”).
198. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 46.1(b) (stating that a court should release a defendant on personal
recognizance or an unsecured bond “unless the judicial officer determines that such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any
other person or the community”).
199. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 6-401(B)(4).
200. Id. 6-401(A) (“If the court finds that the defendant poses a danger to the complaining
witness or alleged victim, the court may refuse to allow the complaining witness or alleged victim
to post bond for the defendant. This rule does not prevent the use of community funds to post a
bond.”).
201. WIS. STAT. § 969.01(4) (2016) (“If bail is imposed, it shall be only in the amount found
necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant.”).
202. Id. (“Conditions of release, other than monetary conditions, may be imposed for the
purpose of protecting members of the community from serious bodily harm or preventing
intimidation of witnesses.”).
203. Id. § 969.035(3)(c).
204. Id. § 969.035(6)(c).
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the community,”205 and at that hearing they have “the right to be
represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain representation,
to have counsel appointed . . . [and] must be afforded an opportunity to
testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at
the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”206
There are, however, a few states that reject the idea that the potential
dangerousness of the defendant should be a factor in setting bail and
maintain that the only permissible reason to impose bail is to ensure the
return of the defendant to court.207
4. Reliance on Bail Schedules
Bail schedules are procedural schemes that provide judges with
standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged,
without taking into consideration the characteristics of an individual
defendant.208 Nineteen states continue to use bail schedules for certain

205. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.21.060(1) (2016).
206. Id. § 10.21.060(3).
207. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a) (“Any person charged with an offense bailable as a matter
of right shall be released pending or during trial on the person’s own recognizance, unless the
court determines, in its discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the person’s
appearance as required.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 9.2(a) (“The judicial officer shall set money bail only
after he determines that no other conditions will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant
in court.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63b(b) (2016) (“The Court Support Services Division shall
establish written uniform weighted release criteria based upon the premise that the least restrictive
condition or conditions of release necessary to ensure the appearance in court of the defendant
and sufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of any other person will not be endangered is the
pretrial release alternative of choice.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/7(b)(1)–(2) (2016) (requiring
that pretrial service agencies take into consideration “the need for financial security to assure the
defendant’s appearance at later proceedings; and appropriate conditions which shall be imposed
to protect against the risks of nonappearance and commission of new offenses or other interference
with the orderly administration of justice before trial”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (2016)
(“A justice or a clerk or assistant clerk of the district court, a bail commissioner . . . shall . . . hold
a hearing in which the defendant and his counsel, if any, may participate and inquire into the case
and shall admit such person to bail on his personal recognizance without surety unless said justice,
clerk or assistant clerk, bail commissioner or master in chancery determines, in the exercise of his
discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the
court.”); MASS R. GOVERNING PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMIT TO BAIL OUT OF CT. 3 (“The
purpose of setting terms for any pre-trial release is to assure the presence at court of the person
released.”); Royalty v. State, 235 So. 2d 718, 720 (Miss. 1970) (holding that “[s]ince the purpose
of allowing bail is to secure the presence of the accused at trial, the amount of bail to be required
is governed largely by the character of the offense committed and the financial ability of the
accused”); State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (holding that
“[m]oney bail may not be used to protect the community by preventing release”).
208. Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, A.B.A CRIM.
JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 13.
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offenses: Alabama,209 Alaska,210 California,211 Colorado,212 Georgia,213
Idaho,214 Iowa,215 Kentucky,216 Montana,217 Nebraska,218 Nevada,219

209. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(b) (establishing a “general guide for circuit, district, and municipal
courts in setting bail”).
210. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 41.
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(c) (West 2016).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-103(4)(b) (2016) (“To the extent a court uses a bond
schedule, the court shall incorporate into the bond schedule conditions of release and factors that
consider the individualized risk and circumstances of a person in custody and all other relevant
criteria and not solely the level of offense . . . .”).
213. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(f)(1) (2016) (“[T]he judge of any court of inquiry may by
written order establish a schedule of bails and unless otherwise ordered by the judge of any court,
a person charged with committing any offense shall be released from custody upon posting bail
as fixed in the schedule.”).
214. IDAHO MISD. CRIM. R. 13(a) (“The amount of bail for misdemeanor traffic offenses and
other criminal offenses shall be as set forth herein. Such bail schedules shall not govern when a
person charged appears before a judge or magistrate, or the defendant’s case is reviewed by a
judge or magistrate, in which case such bail schedules are advisory only and bail may be raised,
lowered or eliminated at the magistrate’s discretion based upon the circumstances of that
particular case. Any judge may also designate a bond schedule for offenses not listed below.”).
215. IOWA CODE § 804.21(5)(a) (West 2016) (“The judicial council shall promulgate rules
and bond levels to be contained within a bond schedule for the release of an arrested person.”).
216. KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.20(1) (“The defendant may execute a bail bond in accordance with
the uniform schedule of bail . . . for designated nonviolent Class D felonies, misdemeanors and
violations without appearing before a judge.”).
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-9-302(1) (2015) (“A judge may establish and post a schedule
of bail for offenses over which the judge has original jurisdiction.”).
218. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.05(1) (2016) (“It shall be the duty of the judges of the county
court in each county to prepare and adopt, by a majority vote, a schedule of bail for all
misdemeanor offenses and such other offenses as the judges deem necessary. It shall contain a list
of such offenses and the amounts of bail applicable thereto as the judges determine to be
appropriate.”).
219. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(7) (2016) (mandating the amount of bail, at least three
thousand and up to fifteen thousand dollars, for certain domestic violence offenses if a defendant
does not personally appear before a judicial officer).
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New Jersey,220 New Mexico,221 Ohio,222 Oklahoma,223 Tennessee,224
Utah,225 Wisconsin,226 and Wyoming.227
In addition to the continued use of bail schedules, some jurisdictions
authorize judicial officers to predetermine the amount of bail when
issuing an arrest warrant. In these states, bail can be set at the time a
judicial officer determines there is probable cause for an arrest, outside
of the defendant’s presence. Twenty states permit the amount of bail to

220. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-12 (West 2016) (setting out “[c]rimes with bail restrictions”);
State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). New Jersey courts “are guided
by bail schedules to promote uniformity” that “suggest ranges of bail for specific offenses.” Steele,
61 A.3d at 182.
221. In re Rodella, 190 P.3d 338, 348 (N.M. 2008) (mentioning the use of bond schedules
and finding that deviation from a set schedule did not amount to willful misconduct).
222. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46(G). In Ohio, the law requires each court to “establish a bail bond
schedule covering all misdemeanors including traffic offenses, either specifically, by type, by
potential penalty, or by some other reasonable method of classification.” Id.
223. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1105.2(B) (2016). “Every judicial district may, upon the order of
the presiding judge for the district, establish a pretrial bail schedule for felony or misdemeanor
offenses . . . .” Id.
224. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 05-018 (Feb. 4, 2005) (stating that “a defendant is entitled to
an individual determination of bond,” regardless of the manner of the arrest, but a jailer may not
release a defendant by using a preset bond schedule published by the judges of the jurisdiction
when a judge or clerk is not readily available).
225. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(3)(B) (“The bail determination shall coincide with the
recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds
substantial cause to deviate from the Schedule.”).
226. WIS. STAT. § 969.065 (2016) (requiring the Wisconsin Judicial Conference to “develop
guidelines for cash bail for persons accused of misdemeanors,” and those guidelines “shall relate
primarily to individuals,” as opposed to the charge); STATE OF WIS., UNIFORM MISDEMEANOR
BAIL
SCHEDULE
77–78
(2016),
https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/fees/docs/
bondsched16.pdf (stating if a defendant lacks proper identification, has insufficient ties to the
community, or has previously failed to appear, then the Wisconsin Uniform Misdemeanor Bail
Schedule lists the amount of cash bail that should be imposed without taking into consideration
the defendant’s financial resources); see also Demmith v. Wis. Judicial Conference, 480 N.W.2d
502, 507–08, 511–12 (Wis. 1992) (finding that the statutory requirement does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine, but that the schedule failed to comply with the statute because it
did “not consider factors which are directly related to an individual’s likelihood to appear in
court”).
227. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 3.1 app. 1. “To ensure uniformity throughout the state,” Wyoming
uses a bail schedule established by the Wyoming Supreme Court “for misdemeanor offenses for
which bond may be posted and forfeited.” Id.
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be affixed to an arrest warrant: Alabama,228 California,229 Colorado,230
Idaho,231 Iowa,232 Kansas,233 Kentucky,234 Louisiana,235 Maine,236
Michigan,237 Minnesota,238 Montana,239 North Dakota,240 Ohio,241

228. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 3.2(a) (“If the defendant is bailable as a matter of right, the arrest
warrant may state the conditions of the defendant’s release on his or her own recognizance . . . or
an amount of an appearance bond or a secured appearance bond predetermined by the court.”).
229. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269(b) (West 2016) (“If a defendant has appeared before a judge
of the court on the charge contained in the complaint, indictment, or information, the bail shall be
in the amount fixed by the judge at the time of the appearance. If that appearance has not been
made, the bail shall be in the amount fixed in the warrant of arrest . . . .”).
230. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(2) (2016) (“If an indictment, information, or complaint
has been filed and the type of bond and conditions of release have been fixed upon return of the
indictment or filing of the information or complaint, the court shall review the propriety of the
type of bond and conditions of release upon first appearance of a person in custody.”).
231. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 5(e) (“Upon advising the defendant of the above rights, the magistrate
shall set bail for the defendant, and in the event the arrest is pursuant to a warrant, said bail shall
be in the amount endorsed upon the warrant unless the magistrate finds good cause to alter the
amount of the bail.”).
232. IOWA CODE § 804.3 (2016) (“If the offense stated in the warrant be bailable, the
magistrate issuing it must make an endorsement thereon as follows: Let the defendant, when
arrested, be (admitted to bail in the sum of ............ dollars) or (stating other conditions of
release).”).
233. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2304(a) (2015) (“The amount of the appearance bond to be
required shall be stated in the warrant.”).
234. KY. R. CRIM. P. 2.06(3) (“If the offense charged is bailable, the judge issuing a warrant
of arrest shall fix the amount of bail and type of security, if any, and endorse it on the warrant.”).
235. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 203 (2016) (“The warrant of arrest may specify the
amount of bail in noncapital cases when the magistrate has authority to fix bail.”).
236. ME. R. CRIM. P. 4(d)(1) (“The amount of bail may be fixed by the court and physically
or electronically endorsed on the warrant.”).
237. MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.102(D) (“[T]he court may specify on the warrant the bail that an
accused may post to obtain release before arraignment on the warrant . . . .”).
238. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.02(1) (requiring that when issuing a warrant, “[f]or all offenses, the
amount of bail must be set, and other conditions of release may be set, by a judge and stated on
the warrant”).
239. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-214(2) (2015) (“The arrest warrant may specify the amount
of bail.”).
240. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1) (“The warrant may also have endorsed upon it the
recommended or acceptable amount of bail if the offense is bailable.”).
241. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4(C)(1)(a). If “the defendant has [already] made an initial appearance
or has failed to appear at an initial appearance,” the warrant must indicate the amount of cash or
secured bail bond. Id.
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Oklahoma,242 Oregon,243 Rhode Island,244 South Dakota,245 Utah,246 and
Wisconsin.247
5. Additional Conditions of Release and the Lack of Pretrial Services
To assist the judge or magistrate in making a bail determination, some
jurisdictions have created pretrial service agencies to interview
defendants prior to their initial appearance.248 These interviews typically
242. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 173 (2016) (“The warrant must . . . state an offense . . . and if the
offense charged is bailable, shall fix the amount of bail and an endorsement shall be made on the
warrant, to the following effect: ‘The defendant is to be admitted to bail in the sum of $______.’
and be signed by the magistrate with his name of office.”).
243. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.140(8) (2015) (“A warrant of arrest shall: Specify the amount of
security for release.”).
244. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1) (“The judge or other officer issuing a warrant may
endorse upon it the amount of bail if the offense is bailable by that judge or officer.”).
245. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-2-4 (2016) (“The committing magistrate who signs the
warrant shall also endorse the amount of bail on it.”).
246. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (“When a warrant of arrest is issued, the judge shall state on
the warrant: The conditions of pretrial release the court requires of the defendant, including
monetary bail.”).
247. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.05(1)–(2) (2015) (“In misdemeanor actions, the judge who
issues a warrant may endorse upon the warrant the amount of bail. The amount and method of
posting bail may be endorsed upon felony warrants.”).
248. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.1(a) (West 2016) (“A court, with the concurrence of the
board of supervisors, may employ an investigative staff for the purpose of recommending whether
a defendant should be released on his or her own recognizance.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4106(1) (2016) (“The chief judge of any judicial district may order a person who is eligible for
bond or other pretrial release to be evaluated by a pretrial services program established pursuant
to this section, which program may advise the court if the person is bond eligible, may provide
information that enables the court to make an appropriate decision on bond and conditions of
release, and may recommend conditions of release consistent with this section.”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-63b(a)(1) (2016) (“The duties of the Court Support Services Division shall include:
To promptly interview, prior to arraignment, any person referred by the police . . . or by a judge.
Such interview shall include, but not be limited to, information concerning the accused person,
his or her family, community ties, prior criminal record and physical and mental condition.”); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/1 (West 2016) (“Each circuit court shall establish a pretrial services agency
to provide the court with accurate background data regarding the pretrial release of persons
charged with felonies and effective supervision of compliance with the terms and conditions
imposed on release.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-909 (2016) (“The district courts of this state are
authorized to designate an official pretrial release agency for a district, or for any county within a
district, whenever the court is satisfied that such agency can render competent and effective
assistance to the court in making its determination of the terms and conditions under which any
court should release a prisoner from jail prior to trial.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.235(2)–(3) (2016)
(“The release assistance officer shall, except when impracticable, interview every person detained
pursuant to law and charged with an offense [and] shall verify release criteria information . . . .”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.4:3(A)(2) (2016); KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.06 (“The duties of a pretrial
services agency authorized by the Administrative Office of the Courts to serve the trial court shall
include interviewing defendants eligible for pretrial release, verifying information obtained from
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focus on the defendant’s work history, financial resources, ties to the
community, and criminal record.
Despite the fact that the American Bar Association has taken the
position that “[e]very jurisdiction should establish a pretrial services
agency or program to collect and present the necessary information,
present risk assessments, and, consistent with court policy, make release
recommendations required by the judicial officer in making release
decisions,”249 states do not always require local jurisdictions to have
pretrial release programs.250
Electronic home monitoring is one increasingly popular condition of
release, although states typically require defendants to pay the costs
associated with it, often directly to the private agency responsible for
providing the service.251
defendants, making recommendations to the court as to whether defendants interviewed should
be released on personal recognizance, identifying veterans, and any other duties ordered by the
Supreme Court.”); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(3) (“On the day of the arraignment, the probation
department shall interview the defendant; the probation department shall report to the court the
pertinent information reasonably necessary to determine the issues of bail and indigency.”); MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 6.02(3) (“To determine conditions of release, the court may investigate the defendant’s
background before or at the defendant’s court appearance. The investigation may be conducted
by probation services or by any other qualified agency as directed by the court.”). Local pretrial
services officers shall “[p]resent a pretrial investigation report with recommendations to assist
courts in discharging their duties related to granting or reconsidering bail.” VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2152.4:3(A)(2).
249. Criminal
Justice
Section
Standards:
Pretrial
Release,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_
pretrialrelease_blk.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
250. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535(b) (2016) (“In any county in which there is a pretrial
release program, the senior resident superior court judge may, after consultation with the chief
district court judge, order that defendants accepted by such program for supervision shall, with
their consent, be released by judicial officials to supervision of such programs . . . .”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 1105.3(A) (2016), amended by 2016 Okla. Sess. Laws 3 (“Any county pursuant to
the provisions of this act may establish and fund a pretrial program to be utilized by the district
court in that jurisdiction.”).
251. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1.1(a), (h)(1) (2016) (authorizing the use of an “electronic
pretrial release and monitoring program” and requiring a defendant in such a program to “pay a
reasonable, nonrefundable fee for program enrollment, equipment use, and monitoring to the
provider of such program”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-201(b)(1)–(2) (West 2016)
(permitting the court, as a condition of pretrial release, to require monitoring of the defendant by
a private home detention monitoring agency and requiring the defendant to pay the agency’s
monitoring fee); MO. REV. STAT. § 544.455(1)(6) (2016) (permitting a judge to “[p]lace the person
on house arrest with electronic monitoring; except that all costs associated with the electronic
monitoring shall be charged to the person on house arrest”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(a)(5)
(2016) (“In determining conditions of pretrial release a judicial official must impose at least one
of the following conditions: House arrest with electronic monitoring.”); OHIO CRIM. R. 46(B)(3)
(“The court may . . . [p]lace the person under a house arrest, electronic monitoring, or work release
program.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1105.2(F)–(G) (West 2016), amended by 2016 Okla. Sess.
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6. The Use of Evidence Based Risk Assessment Tools
Some courts have also started using an evidence based risk assessment
tool as part of the bail determination.252 Evidence based pretrial risk
assessment tools measure the risk that a defendant, if released pending
trial, will fail to appear for a court date or will commit a new crime.
It is estimated that only about 10% of judicial officers across the
country use pretrial risk assessment tools to make release decisions, in
part because they require costly and time-consuming interviews with
defendants.253 Only three states, Kentucky, Ohio, and Virginia, have
created and validated a state-specific risk assessment instrument for use
by pretrial services agencies across the entire state.254

Laws ch. 59 (“The court may require the person to be placed on an electronic monitoring device
as a condition of pretrial release [and] may impose payment of a supervision fee [which] shall be
a condition of pretrial release . . . .”);; see also Erik Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t
Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrownjail-2065283 (finding that Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Washington all
contract with private, for-profit companies requiring individuals to pay for their own tracking).
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(3)(b) (2016) (“In determining the type of bond and
conditions of release, if practicable and available in the jurisdiction, the court shall use an
empirically developed risk assessment instrument designed to improve pretrial release decisions
by providing to the court information that classifies a person in custody based upon predicted
level of risk of pretrial failure.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63b(b) (2016) (“The Court Support
Services Division shall establish written uniform weighted release criteria . . . .”); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 2104(d) (2016) (“In making a release determination, or imposing conditions set
forth in § 2108 of this title, the court shall employ an objective risk assessment instrument to
gauge the person’s risk of flight and re-arrest and the safety of the victim and the community.”);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/20 (2016) (“In preparing and presenting its written reports . . . pretrial
services agencies shall in appropriate cases include specific recommendations for the setting,
increase, or decrease of bail; the release of the interviewee on his own recognizance in sums
certain; and the imposition of pretrial conditions to bail or recognizance . . . . In establishing
objective internal criteria of any such recommendation policies, the agency may utilize so-called
‘point scales’ for evaluating the aforementioned risks, but no interviewee shall be considered as
ineligible for particular agency recommendations by sole reference to such procedures.”); UTAH
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UNIFORM FINE/BAIL FORFEITURE SCHEDULE 4 (2016),
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule.pdf (utilizing
a “criminal history assessment” based on prior convictions and previous levels of supervision in
determining the amount of bail to be set).
253. MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND., ASSESSING PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW 3 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_no-interview_
FNL.pdf.
254. CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 19 (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/PJI%20State%
20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20(2011).pdf.
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II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that “[t]he Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding
against an accused.”255 What is less clear is when counsel must actually
be present.256
In Coleman v. Alabama,257 the Supreme Court found that an indigent
defendant had a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing.258 The Court
found that a number of factors made the presence of counsel necessary:
First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and crossexamination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in
the State’s case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind
the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled
interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in crossexamination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not
appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more
effectively discover the case the State has against his client
and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to
meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be
influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective
arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity
for an early psychiatric examination or bail.259
The Court’s reference to the ability of counsel to make an “effective
argument” regarding bail supports the argument that where an initial
appearance includes a bail determination, it would require the actual
presence of counsel to assist the defendant.
However, the Court’s holding in Gerstein v. Pugh260 undermines that
argument. In Gerstein, the Court held that a judicial officer must make a
prompt determination regarding probable cause for a warrantless arrest
but “[b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the
probable cause determination is not a ‘critical stage’ in the prosecution
that would require appointed counsel.”261 It is important to note that
255. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 203 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180–81 (1991)).
256. Id. at 213–14 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As I interpret our precedents, the term
‘attachment’ signifies nothing more than the beginning of the defendant’s prosecution. It does not
mark the beginning of a substantive entitlement to the assistance of counsel.”).
257. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
258. Id. at 9–10.
259. Id. at 9.
260. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
261. Id. at 122, 125.
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Gerstein involved only a determination regarding probable cause, a
determination identical to the one that takes place when a judicial officer
issues an arrest warrant, a process that occurs outside of the presence of
the defendant. The factors involved in making decisions regarding
conditions of pretrial release are far more complex and focus on the
characteristics of the defendant and, to a lesser extent, the allegations
against the defendant.
A. Trial-Like Confrontations
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “core purpose” of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the
assistance of counsel at trial.262 At the same time, the Court has
recognized that there are certain pretrial proceedings where a defendant
may be “confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his
expert adversary, or by both.”263 The Court has also recognized that there
are situations where the results of a pretrial confrontation “might well
settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”264
This has led the Court to conclude that indigent defendants are entitled
to the presence of appointed counsel during any “critical stage” of the
proceedings.265 The Court defines “critical stages” as “proceedings
between an individual and agents of the State (whether ‘formal or
informal, in court or out’) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at
which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems
or . . . meeting his adversary.’”266
In states where the judicial officer must consider the weight of the
evidence against the accused or the likelihood of conviction when
determining conditions of pretrial release, the initial appearance is clearly
a trial-like confrontation. If a prosecutor happens to be present, or is able
to communicate to the judicial officer the prosecutor’s position regarding

262. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (finding that “the core purpose of the
counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was confronted with both
the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor”).
263. Id. at 310.
264. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (finding that defendants have a right
to counsel at a pretrial lineup).
265. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008) (“Once attachment occurs, the
accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the
post-attachment proceedings; what makes a stage critical is what shows the need for counsel’s
presence. Thus, counsel must be appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for
adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial itself.” (footnotes
omitted)).
266. Id. at 212 n.16 (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
226 (1967); and then quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1973)).
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appropriate conditions of pretrial release, then it would seem equally
clear that the accused would be entitled to the assistance of counsel.
B. The Threat to Public Safety
In United States v. Salerno,267 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. At issue in Salerno was
whether the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the ground
that a defendant is a danger to the community. 268 The Court found that
the “[g]overnment’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”269
While scholars have criticized the Court’s decision in Salerno for
failing to appreciate the significance of the presumption of innocence,270
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 outlined specific procedures that needed to
be followed before a defendant could be denied bail because the
defendant was a threat to the safety of the community.271 As the Court
noted, the Act was not “a scattershot attempt to incapacitate” defendants
accused of serious crimes.272 The Court relied on the fact that following
a judicial determination of probable cause, the defendant is entitled to “a
full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral
decision maker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of
release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any
person.”273
While states have embraced the idea of preventative detention based
on the perceived dangerousness of a defendant, state statutes that permit
judicial officers to take the potential dangerousness of a defendant into
consideration when determining conditions of pretrial release do not
contain the same procedural protections as the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
They are the type of “scattershot attempts” to incapacitate defendants
solely based on the nature of the charge that the Supreme Court did not
have to address in Salerno. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
defendants who are denied bail are entitled to a prompt hearing where
they have a right to counsel.274 State statutes that permit a judicial officer
to deny bail based on the perceived dangerousness of the defendant do
267. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
268. Id. at 755.
269. Id. at 748.
270. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723,
750 (2011); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 335, 351–54 (1990).
271. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
272. Id. at 750.
273. Id.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012).
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not typically afford the defendant the right to a hearing or the right to
counsel.
C. Pretrial Events that Impact the Trial
Even if bail hearings in state court did not resemble trial-like
confrontations, it is clear that pretrial incarceration adversely impacts the
ultimate outcome for defendants. The Supreme Court has observed that
the “traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense.”275 The Court has acknowledged
that “if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather
evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”276 The
Court has also recognized that the time between a defendant’s
arraignment and the beginning of trial is a “critical period of the
proceedings . . . when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and
preparation” are of vital importance.277
Recent empirical studies demonstrate the adverse impacts of pretrial
incarceration. One study found that defendants characterized as low-risk
who were detained pretrial were over five times more likely to be
sentenced to jail and over three times more likely to be sentenced to
prison than defendants who were released at some point pending trial.278
The same study also found that defendants characterized as moderate or
high risk who were not released before trial or disposition were three
times more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than defendants who
were released and all defendants who were detained pretrial, regardless
of classification as low or high risk, received longer jail and prison
sentences than defendants who were released.279
Even if the Court views the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a
right designed to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, the
obstacles that defendants who are incarcerated face when attempting to
prepare a defense arguably impacts the fairness of their trial and, in some
cases, may exert pressure on them to waive their right to trial and plead
guilty. The fact that defendants who are incarcerated have worse case
outcomes suggests that pretrial incarceration impacts the fairness of the
adjudication process.
275. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
276. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2493 (2004) (noting that “[d]etained
defendants find it harder to meet and strategize with their lawyers and to track down witnesses”).
277. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
278. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING
THE I MPACT OF P RETRIAL D ETENTION ON S ENTENCING O UTCOMES 4 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_
FNL.pdf.
279. Id.
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D. Actual Incarceration
In Gideon v. Wainwright,280 the Supreme Court recognized the
“obvious truth” that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”281 While the
Court’s decision in Gideon overturned a felony conviction, the language
the Court used suggested that indigent defendants had a right to counsel
in any criminal prosecution.282
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,283 the Court extended the right to counsel
to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors who were sentenced
to incarceration.284 The Court would later clarify the Argersinger holding
in Scott v. Illinois,285 “[W]e believe that the central premise of
Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”286
While the Supreme Court does not regard pretrial incarceration as
punitive, it is clear from Argersinger and Scott that the law requires
counsel when a judge wishes to impose any amount of incarceration
following a conviction. While the Court’s distinction between postadjudicative incarceration and pre-adjudicative incarceration is
reasonable because of the collateral consequences of conviction,287 it
becomes less reasonable as the length of pretrial incarceration increases.
One study estimates that the average length of pretrial confinement in
2013 was twenty-three days, an increase from fourteen days in 1983.288

280. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
281. Id. at 344.
282. Id. (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”).
283. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
284. Id. at 37.
285. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
286. Id. at 373.
287. See John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 55 (2013).
288. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR:
THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (2015), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/
downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf.
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E. Sentencing Hearings
Prior to the Court’s decision in Gideon, the Court had relied on the
Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments when
ruling that indigent defendants were entitled to the assistance of
counsel.289 Following the Gideon decision, the Court clarified that these
earlier cases “stand for the proposition that appointment of counsel for an
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”290 This includes
the right to counsel at sentencing, even if the judge has very limited
discretion in sentencing.291 The Court has recognized “the necessity for
the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of
mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the
defendant to present his case as to sentence.”292
Bail hearings, like sentencing hearings, offer the opportunity to
present the same type of mitigating circumstances that may influence a
judge’s ultimate decision regarding the terms and conditions of
confinement. Consider a sentencing hearing where a judge had the option
of imposing a sentence of probation with various conditions or a sentence
of incarceration. In many ways, such a hearing mirrors the type of
decisions made by a judge during a bail hearing, especially in
jurisdictions where a judge must weigh any potential threat a defendant
poses to the community or to an individual.
F. Plea Bargaining
The idea that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure the
reliability of a conviction following trial is undermined by the fact that
97% of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas.293 The Supreme Court has recognized that the current
289. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52 (1961) (holding that the failure to appoint
counsel at a defendant’s arraignment was a denial of due process since Alabama law required
certain defense to be plead at arraignment); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161, 165 (1957)
(finding a denial of due process when the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive
counsel before entering a guilty plea); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding
that the absence of counsel at sentencing coupled with inaccurate assumptions about the
defendant’s criminal record deprived the defendant of due process).
290. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
291. See id. at 135 (stating that the law requires counsel at sentencing even though judge was
required to sentence the defendant to the maximum term provided by law and only makes a
recommendation to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles); see also Glover v. United States, 531
U.S. 198, 204 (2001) (holding that defense counsel could be found to have provided ineffective
assistance for failing to object to an error of law affecting the sentencing calculation even if the
error did not result in a significant increase in the sentence).
292. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
293. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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criminal justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.”294 The Court has described plea bargains as “central to
the administration of the criminal justice system.”295 The Court also
recognized the practical effect of a criminal justice system that relies
almost exclusively on plea bargaining: “In today’s criminal justice
system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the
unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”296
Pretrial incarceration plays a large role in plea bargaining, especially
for defendants who are charged with misdemeanors and may be able to
receive a sentence of time already served.297 In ruling that indigent
defendants charged with misdemeanors have a right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the
prejudice that results from “assembly line justice.”298 In a criminal justice
system where guilt is primarily adjudicated pretrial and where judicial
officers are called upon to make predictive determinations regarding guilt
at a defendant’s initial appearance, it makes sense to require the presence
of counsel at that initial appearance.
III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Supreme Court recognized that indigent defendants have a right
to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause in
Powell v. Alabama,299 more than thirty years before the Court’s landmark
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which granted indigent defendants the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.300 In Powell, the Court
stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
294. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
295. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. “To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and
defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It
is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
296. Id.
297. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2012)
(describing the mechanics of the petty offense process and its disregard for the evidentiary
checking mechanism of standard criminal practice).
298. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
299. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
300. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/4

40

Gross: The Right To Counsel But Not The Presence of Counsel: A Survey of

2017]

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BUT NOT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL

871

the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.301
While an indigent defendant does not face the possibility of conviction
at his initial appearance, the defendant still faces the possibility of pretrial
incarceration. If the judicial officer charged with making the pretrial
release decision must take into consideration the likelihood of conviction
and the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the danger is that
an indigent defendant who “lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he ha[s] a perfect one”
will be subjected to pretrial incarceration.302 As the Court has said, it is
an “obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal
with power to take his life or liberty. . . . That which is simple, orderly,
and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate,
complex and mysterious.”303
A. The Need for Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Assuming that a defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial
officer who has the power to restrict the defendant’s liberty is not a
“critical stage” of the proceedings under the Sixth Amendment, the
question remains what procedural protections are required under the Due
Process Clause. When evaluating what procedures are required to ensure
due process of law, the Supreme Court considers three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

301. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69.
302. See id. at 69.
303. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
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additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.304
The Court has recognized that when evaluating the “private interest
that will be affected,” an indigent defendant’s loss of personal liberty
through imprisonment lies “at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”305 At the same time, the Court has said that the concept
of due process of law “is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”306 The court has said that
applying the Due Process Clause is “an uncertain enterprise” that requires
discovering “what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular
situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by
assessing the several interests that are at stake.”307 With that in mind, the
Court has ruled on which specific procedural protections are required
before an indigent defendant can be deprived of her liberty during parole
revocation hearings, probation revocation hearings, and civil contempt
proceedings.
1. Parole Revocation Hearings
In Morrissey v. Brewer,308 the Supreme Court considered what type
of procedural protections parolees are entitled to at a parole revocation
hearing.309 Since the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal
prosecution, the Court ruled that “the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply.”310 Nevertheless, the
Court found that a parolee has a liberty interest that “must be seen as
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”311 The court also
noted that a parolee “is not the only one who has a stake in in his
conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of
restoring him to normal and useful life within the law.”312
In determining what process is due to a parolee facing revocation, the
Court found that the typical process of parole revocation involved two
important stages: the arrest of the parolee and the preliminary hearing
304. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
305. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
80 (1992)).
306. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
307. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981).
308. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
309. Id. at 472.
310. Id. at 480.
311. Id. at 482.
312. Id. at 484.
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followed by the revocation hearing.313 In terms of the arrest and
preliminary hearing, the Court required that the parolee be given notice
of the alleged violation; the opportunity to speak on his own behalf; the
right to bring letters, documents, or individuals to testify before the
hearing officer; and the right to question the person who gave the
information on which the parole revocation is based.314 In addition, the
law requires the hearing officer to make a summary or digest of what
occurs at the hearing.315
2. Probation Revocation Hearings
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,316 the Supreme Court found that a
“[p]robation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal
prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty.”317 Consequently, the
Court found that a probationer “is entitled to a preliminary and a final
revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v.
Brewer.”318 The Court of Appeals had held that a probationer was entitled
to counsel at a revocation hearing, but the Supreme Court declined to
adopt a rule requiring counsel in all such cases.319 Instead, the Court
adopted a “case-by-case approach to the right to counsel” in probation
and parole revocation hearings.320
The Court noted that “[b]oth the probationer or parolee and the State
have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of
discretion.” Specifically, these interests include the interests of “the
probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken
away and the State to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily
interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently
prejudicing the safety of the community.”321 The Court also noted that
the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey “serve as substantial
protection against ill-considered revocation.”322 That being said, the
Court was not convinced that probationers or parolees could always rely
upon those procedural protections to guarantee their due process at a
revocation hearing:
313. Id. at 485–87.
314. Id. at 486–87.
315. Id. at 487.
316. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
317. Id. at 782.
318. Id. The Court found “that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent’s
contention that the State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all
probation or parole revocation cases.” Id. at 787.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 788.
321. Id. at 785.
322. Id. at 786.
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[T]he effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey
may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which
the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the
informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of
technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or
uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty
in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of
witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex
documentary evidence.323
The question of whether a parolee or probationer should be
provided with counsel is therefore left up to the discretion of the
judicial officer responsible for conducting a revocation hearing. At
least in some cases, due process requires that a parolee or
probationer be provided with counsel.
Currently, the procedural protections afforded to parolees and
probations at revocation hearings by the Supreme Court appear to
be greater than those available to defendants during an initial
appearance in state courts where judicial officers determine
conditions of pretrial release.
3. Civil Contempt Proceedings
In Turner v. Rogers,324 the Supreme Court held that “the Due Process
Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil
contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration.”325 In deciding
that due process did not require counsel, the Court relied on three
factors.326
First, “the critical question likely at issue in these cases
concerns . . . the defendant’s ability to pay,” which “is often closely
related to the question of the defendant’s indigence.”327 Second, counsel
is unlikely to represent the opposing party.328 Third, there are ‘“substitute
procedural safeguards”’ that “can significantly reduce the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of liberty.”329

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 786–87.
564 U.S. 431 (2011).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his
‘ability to pay’ is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding;
(2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant
financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for
the defendant to respond to statements and questions about
his financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on
the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that the
defendant has the ability to pay.330
There are aspects of the Court’s holding in Turner that are applicable
to bail hearings. First, the court’s conclusion that a determination of an
individual’s financial resources, of their ability to pay, can be
accomplished without the aid of counsel supports the argument that due
process does not require counsel in order to determine if a defendant in a
criminal case is indigent. Second, since the Court relied, at least in part,
on the absence of opposing counsel when holding that due process does
not require counsel in Turner, the presence of a prosecutor at a
defendant’s initial appearance would seem to necessitate the presence of
defense counsel. Third, assuming counsel is not required at a defendant’s
initial appearance, due process requires alternative procedural safeguards
similar to those the Court identified in Turner.
4. Objective Pretrial Risk Assessments
One question that arises is whether objective pretrial risk assessments
can be the kind of “alternative procedural safeguards” called for in
Turner. Pretrial risk assessment is an attempt to identify factors that are
predictive of pretrial misconduct including a defendant’s prior failures to
appear, arrest record, and other factors that indicate a likelihood that the
defendant will reoffend.331 When evaluating these factors, a point scale
assigns a certain number of points for specific factors that have some
correlation to pretrial misconduct.332 The resulting score is then used to
categorize a defendant as a low, moderate, or high risk for failure to
appear or to commit another offense.333
While some states have adopted evidence based pretrial risk
assessments,334 it is important to understand what factors those
instruments take into consideration. A survey of existing studies
identified six validated pretrial risk factors: (1) prior failure to appear; (2)
prior convictions; (3) present charge a felony; (4) being unemployed; (5)
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 447–48.
See MAMALIAN, supra note 254, at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 18.
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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history of drug abuse; and (6) having a pending case.335 None of these
factors take into account the likelihood of conviction, the weight of the
evidence against a defendant, or potential defense. Four of the factors—
prior failures to appear, prior convictions, the fact that the present charge
is a felony, and the existence of a pending case—all deal with a
defendant’s prior criminal record. The use of employment status as a risk
factor may increase the likelihood of bail being set for an indigent
defendant since defendants classified as indigent are more likely to be
unemployed. Without consideration of additional factors, pretrial risk
assessments can resemble bail schedules.336
Another concern is the extent to which a pretrial risk assessment has
been validated. A survey by the Pretrial Justice Institute found that of
those pretrial programs that do risk assessment, only 42% report having
developed their risk assessment procedures based on research done in
their own jurisdictions.337 The same survey found that 48% of pretrial
programs have never validated their pretrial risk assessment instruments
and also found that there is no standard method pretrial programs use for
validation.338 So while there is certainly evidence that objective, validated
pretrial risk assessment instruments can assist judicial officers in making
pretrial release decisions, they cannot replace the procedural safeguards
called for in cases like Morrissey, Gagnon, and Turner.
5. The Role of an Advocate
It is possible for a judge or magistrate to conduct a bail hearing in such
a way as to minimize the disadvantages an indigent defendant suffers
because the defendant is unrepresented. If a pretrial services agency
provided the hearing officer with detailed information about the
defendant, and the hearing officer thoroughly reviewed the allegations
against the defendant, with an eye toward identifying potential defenses
and potential weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, it might minimize the
prejudice to an indigent defendant. However, this type of examination
without advocacy is not an adequate substitute for counsel.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Douglas v. California339 illustrates
this point. In Douglas, the Court found that indigent appellants have a
right to counsel despite the fact that the law required appellate court
335. MAMALIAN, supra note 254, at 9.
336. See VANNOSTRAND & LOWENKAMP, supra note 253, at 20 (concluding that one can
conduct accurate pretrial risk assessments without interviewing defendants).
337. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 37 (2009),
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/new-PJI%202009%20Survey%20of%20Pretrial%
20Services%20Programs.pdf.
338. Id. at 63.
339. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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judges to make an independent investigation of the record to determine if
the appointment of counsel would be to the advantage of the appellant or
the court and should deny the appointment of counsel only if such
appointment would be of no value to the appellant or the court.340 The
Court found that despite the opportunity for judicial review, “the type of
an appeal a person is afforded . . . hinges upon whether or not he can pay
for the assistance of counsel.”341
The ability of the appellant to hire counsel would result in judicial
review “after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument
by counsel,” but “only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and,
unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is
forced to go without a champion on appeal.”342 The Court found that there
was enough of a difference between an “ex parte examination of the
record”343 by a judge and the advocacy that counsel could provide that
the failure to appoint counsel was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion regarding a judge’s
ability to be an advocate for a defendant during trial in Powell v.
Alabama.344 The Court noted that a judge “can and should see to it that
in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly
and fairly,” but a judge “cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the
defense, or participate in those necessary conferences between counsel
and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the
confessional.”345 The Court reached the same conclusion in Carnley v.
Cochran346 when it ruled that “the trial judge could not effectively
discharge the roles of both judge and defense counsel.”347
The criminal defense bar also recognizes the critical role that counsel
plays at the initial appearance where a judicial officer sets bail.348 The
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has adopted a
resolution calling for “counsel at the first appearance before a judicial
officer at which liberty is at stake or at which a plea of guilty to any

340. Id. at 355.
341. Id. at 355–56.
342. Id. at 356.
343. Id. (emphasis omitted).
344. 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932)
345. Id.
346. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
347. Id. at 510.
348. See Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of
the Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspectives, 32 PACE
L. REV. 800, 801 (2012).
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criminal charge may be entered.”349 The Oregon Office of Public Defense
Services recommends that defense providers “should ensure that an
attorney is present at the first appearance in court of any person who may
be entitled to representation by appointed counsel at state expense,
including the initial arraignment in criminal cases.”350
The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy produced a ninetyfour-page Pretrial Release Manual351 to assist assigned counsel in
litigating issues surrounding pretrial release. The Colorado State Public
Defender also publishes a seventy-eight-page Bail Book352 for identical
reasons. In addition, empirical data also shows that representation at a
bail hearing makes a substantial difference in judicial outcomes.353
349. Resolution of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers on Right to Counsel at Initial Appearance Before a Judicial Officer at Which Liberty Is
at Stake or at Which a Plea of Guilty to Any Criminal Charge May Be Entered, NAT’L ASS’N
CRIM. DEF. LAWS (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.nacdl.org/resolutions/2012mm1/. But see Criminal
Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, supra note 249 (stating at the first appearance, the
judicial officer should inform a defendant that the defendant “has a right to counsel in future
proceedings, and that if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed”).
350. STATE OF OR., OFFICE OF PUB. DEF. SERVS., BEST PRACTICES FOR OREGON PUBLIC
DEFENSE PROVIDERS 12 (2010), https://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/BestPractices
March2010Revision.pdf. But see N.C. COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE
TRIAL LEVEL 4 (2004), http://www.ncids.org/Rules%20&%20Procedures/Performance%
20Guidelines/Trial%20Level%20Final%20Performance%20Guidelines.pdf (advising attorneys
that “[a]s soon as possible after appointment, where the client has not been able to obtain pretrial
release, counsel should consider filing a motion to reduce bond or otherwise modify any pretrial
release conditions that were set by the magistrate or other judicial official at the client’s initial
appearance”); N.D. COMM’N ON LEGAL COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS, MINIMUM ATTORNEY
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: CRIMINAL MATTERS § 6.1 (2004), http://www.nd.gov/indigents/docs/
performanceStandardsCriminal.pdf (stating that “counsel should meet with incarcerated clients
within 24 hours after assignment to the case”); STATE BAR OF TEX., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
FOR NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION 3 (2011), https://www.texasbar.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home& Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=29497
(stating that “if the client is in custody, the initial interview should take place within three business
days after counsel receives notice of assignment to the client’s case”).
351. KY. DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE MANUAL (2013),
https://www.pretrial.org/download/advocacy/Kentucky%20Pretrial%20Release%20Manual%20
-%20Kentucky%20Dept.%20of%20Public%20Advocacy%202013.pdf.
352. COLO. CRIM. DEF. INST. ET AL., THE COLORADO BAIL BOOK: A DEFENSE PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO ADULT PRETRIAL RELEASE (2015), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
Colorado_Bail_Book_Pretrial_Release.pdf.
353. THE CONST. PROJECT NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., DON’T I NEED A LAWYER?
PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING 32–36 (2015),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf
(discussing studies done by the Manhattan Bail Project in New York City, the National Institute
of Justice in Passaic, New Jersey, Shelby County, Tennessee, and Palm Beach, Florida, and the
Baltimore City Lawyers at Bail Project in Baltimore Maryland).
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B. The Nature of Pretrial Detention
The Supreme Court recognizes “a distinction between punitive
measures that may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a
determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may.”354 The Court
has regarded pretrial detention as regulatory and not penal.355 In reaching
that conclusion, the Court has looked at the legislative intent behind
statutes that authorize pretrial detention and concluded that pretrial
detention is designed to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court,
safeguard the judicial process, and ensure community safety.356
That being said, the Court has also warned that “the mere invocation
of a legitimate purpose will not justify particular restrictions and
conditions of confinement amounting to punishment.”357 Even assuming
that pretrial restrictions on a defendant’s liberty serve legitimate
regulatory purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether those
restrictions are reasonably tailored to achieve those purposes.358
When making a determination whether a statute is penal or regulatory,
in addition to looking at legislative intent, the Court has also identified a
number of factors that should be considered:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned . . . .359
Two factors justify a reevaluation of the character of pretrial detention
at the state level: the effectiveness of alternative forms of monitoring to
ensure a defendant’s return to court and the widespread passage of bail
jumping statutes.

354. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
355. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
356. Id. at 747.
357. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984).
358. Id. (“Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms and conditions of confinement . . . are
in fact compatible with those purposes.”).
359. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
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1. Prohibition on Excessiveness
Prior to the development of pretrial service programs, the pretrial
detention of a defendant to ensure the defendant’s return to court may
have been the only reliable option available. However, there are now a
wide range of options that could be used to ensure that the defendant
returns to court.360 Pretrial service organizations can actively monitor
defendants who are high risk and can use home confinement or GPS to
monitor lower risk defendants.361 Not all jurisdictions have invested in
pretrial services or alternatives to incarceration, but that does not change
the fact that they are available to them and are actually less costly than
relying on pretrial incarceration.362
One of the factors to consider when evaluating whether restrictions on
liberty are penal or regulatory is whether it appears excessive in light of
the other options available. Considering the successful implementation of
pretrial services programs and alternatives to incarceration at the federal
level, the continued reliance on pretrial detention to ensure appearance in
court at the state level seems excessive and therefore punitive.
2. Administrative Detention for Something That Is a Crime
Bail jumping statutes make the failure to appear in court a separate
offense.363 A defendant who fails to appear runs the risk of being charged
with a separate offense, one which she is very likely to be convicted of,
even if she is acquitted of the underlying offense that gave rise to the
charge of bail jumping. Bail jumping statutes have proliferated over the
last fifty years and their existence raises questions about the nature of
pretrial detention.364 If pretrial detention is seen as a means of ensuring a

360. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 289, at 34 (“There are other options for the safe release
of many more defendants either on their own recognizance or with the aid of special conditions
and supervision. These options, deployed under the umbrella term of pretrial services, require
jurisdictions to develop the capacity to conduct formal risk assessments, to speed the time from
arrest to initial bail hearing, and to invest in pretrial supervision resources to enable the nonfinancial release of those deemed too high a risk for ROR.”).
361. See, e.g., Pretrial Services, ALACHUA CTY. http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/Court
Services/Pages/PretrialServices.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2017).
362. Supervision Costs Significantly Less Than Incarceration in Federal System, U.S. CTS.
(July 18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-lessincarceration-federal-system (“Pretrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more
expensive than the cost of supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal
system.”).
363. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1455–56 (2009).
364. Id. at 1457 (“Today, only four states do not separately penalize failure to appear: South
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Indiana. Moreover, almost every jurisdiction has actively
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defendant’s appearance in court, the fact that failing to appear is itself a
crime suggests that pretrial detention is penal since “the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime.”365
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court noted that “there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.”366 The fact
that the wealthy have an absolute right to have counsel present at their
initial appearance and the poor do not raises equal protection concerns.
In addition, the continued reliance on financial securities when making
pretrial release decisions means that the wealthy go free while the poor
remain in jail.
A. Attachment and Appearance
The Court held in Rothgery that “a criminal defendant’s initial
appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary
judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.”367 The Court explicitly did not rule on the issue of when
a court had to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant.368 The Court has
historically made a distinction between when the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel “attaches” and when a court must actually provide counsel to
a defendant.369 The statement by the Court that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has “attached” is simply another way of saying that a
criminal prosecution has begun.
The distinction the Court makes between the availability of counsel
and the need for counsel is troubling. In effect, the Court is saying that a
defendant has an absolute right to have an attorney appear at his initial
appearance, if the defendant can afford to do so, since the Sixth
tinkered with their bail jumping provisions—thirty-five statutes were substantially amended
within the past fifteen years, many multiple times.” (footnote omitted)).
365. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
366. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
367. Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
368. Id. (“Our holding is narrow. We do not decide whether the 6-month delay in
appointment of counsel resulted in prejudice to Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights, and have no
occasion to consider what standards should apply in deciding this.”); see also id. at 213–14 (Alito,
J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion because I do not understand it to hold that a defendant
is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel as soon as his Sixth Amendment right attaches.
As I interpret our precedents, the term ‘attachment’ signifies nothing more than the beginning of
the defendant’s prosecution. It does not mark the beginning of a substantive entitlement to the
assistance of counsel.”).
369. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
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Amendment right to counsel has “attached” once formal charges have
been filed and his liberty is subject to restriction. At the same time, even
though the right to counsel has “attached,” the State is under no obligation
to provide counsel to an indigent defendant at his initial appearance when
his liberty is subject to restriction. In effect, the Court is sanctioning two
justice systems: one for the wealthy and one for the poor.
B. Fair Opportunity to Present a Defense
The Supreme Court “has long recognized that when a State brings its
judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding,
it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to
present his defense.”370 However, the equal protection afforded to
indigent defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment is not without
limits. In finding that indigent defendants have no right to counsel for a
discretionary appeal, the Court observed “the fact that a particular service
might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the
service is constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our cases
is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a
criminal defendant . . . .”371 The Court has acknowledged the fact that an
indigent defendant is “somewhat handicapped in comparison with a
wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him in every conceivable
manner at every stage in the proceeding.”372 The mere fact that the
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant would be beneficial
does not mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires it.
There can be no doubt that the presence of counsel would be a benefit
to indigent defendants during a bail hearing, but the question is whether
the absence of counsel deprives an indigent defendant of a “fair
opportunity to present his defense.”373 The Court has held that “the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness,
derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a
result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”374
370. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
371. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[The State is not required to] equalize economic conditions. A man
of means may be able to afford the retention of an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a
poor man’s purse. Those are contingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the
duty, of a State to correct or cushion.”).
372. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616.
373. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
374. Id.; see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”).
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The inability of indigent defendants to meaningfully participate in a bail
hearing, a judicial proceeding where their liberty is at stake, renders
counsel not just beneficial, but essential.375 Without counsel, from the
perspective of most indigent defendants, the bail hearing is reduced to a
“meaningless ritual.”376
C. Bail Schedules
Over fifty years ago the Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]here can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.”377 The Court has also said that “the Fourteenth
Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal
scale” and has held “that to interpose any financial consideration between
an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for
his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”378
When considering cases involving indigent defendants who were
imprisoned because of their inability to pay a fine, the Court has found
that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to imprison an indigent
defendant beyond the statutory maximum fixed by statute who is
financially unable to pay a fine.379 The Equal Protection Clause also
“prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant
is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”380 Similarly, the
Court has found that an indigent defendant’s probation may not be
summarily terminated for a failure to pay a fine since “[t]o do otherwise
would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because,
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation
would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”381
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of
fixed-sum bail schedules. However, in Stack v. Boyle,382 the Court
required an individualized determination regarding appropriate
conditions of pretrial release.383 With that in mind, the U.S. Court of
375. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”).
376. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
377. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
378. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709, 714 (1961).
379. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
380. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508,
509 (1970)).
381. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983).
382. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
383. Id. at 5.
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted that while the “[u]tilization of a
master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those
who have no difficulty in meetings its requirements . . . incarceration of
those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other possible
alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection
requirements.”384
The Department of Justice has taken the position that “any bail or
bond scheme that mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different
offenses in order to gain pretrial release, without any regard for
indigence, not only violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection clause, but also constitutes bad public policy.”385 The
American Bar Association has adopted the same position:
Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized
decision taking into account the special circumstances of
each defendant, the defendant’s ability to meet the financial
conditions and the defendant’s flight risk, and should never
be set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts
fixed according to the nature of the charge.386
The setting of bail on an arrest warrant raises the same concerns
associated with the use of bail schedules. A judicial officer who affixes
an amount of bail to an arrest warrant does so upon a finding that there is
probable cause to arrest but without any specific information regarding
the defendant.387 In effect, the judicial officer is setting bail based solely
on the offense charged without regard to the financial resources of the
defendant.
CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, the number of annual admissions to local
jails nearly doubled, from 6 million in 1983 to 11.7 million in 2013.388
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 744,600 people were
confined in county and city jails at midyear 2014, and 62% of those
confined, 467,500 people, were not convicted.389 The costs associated
with pretrial incarceration are enormous; one estimate is that states spent
384. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
385. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv34-MHT-WC, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (No. 26),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/file/761266/download.
386. Criminal Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, supra note 249.
387. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
388. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 7.
389. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2014, at 1, 3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf.
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$17 billion on pretrial detention in 2012.390 The impact that pretrial
incarceration has on a defendant is obvious: “The time spent in jail
awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means
loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails
offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent
in jail is simply dead time.”391
Despite the enormous costs associated with pretrial detention, states
have failed to adopt the reforms instituted fifty years ago at the federal
level. Predictive determinations regarding guilt, an overemphasis on the
potential dangerousness of defendants, a lack of adequate pretrial
services, and continued reliance on financial securities still characterize
state systems.
During that same time, the Supreme Court has done little to ensure
that the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants are protected
when they appear for the first time before a judicial officer that has the
power to restrict their liberty, despite the fact that the setting of bail
implicates an indigent defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and the right to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never found the setting of bail to
be a critical stage of the proceedings that would require the presence of
counsel or discussed what procedural safeguards should be in place to
protect the rights of indigent defendants. These failures may have
contributed to the rising rates of pretrial incarceration.
It should come as no surprise that the constitutionality of state systems
for setting bail have gone unchallenged for so long since the systems are
designed to delay the appointment of counsel. As the Supreme Court has
said, “[N]ew cases expose old infirmities which apathy or absence of
challenge has permitted to stand.”392
The Court has acknowledged that the “extension of the right to
counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of
criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to generate pretrial
events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial
itself.”393 It is time for the Court to recognize that changing patterns of
criminal procedure have made a defendant’s initial appearance a critical
stage of the proceeding.

390. Christopher Ingraham, Why We Spend Billions to Keep Half a Million Unconvicted
People Behind Bars, WASH. POST (June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/06/11/why-we-spend-billions-to-keep-half-a-million-unconvicted-people-behind-bars/.
391. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972) (footnote omitted).
392. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970).
393. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
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